

**POWER RELATION BETWEEN TAREKAT
QADIRYAH WANAQSYABANDIYAH
(TAREKAT CUKIR) AND PARTAI PERSATUAN
PEMBANGUNAN (PPP) IN JOMBANG, EAST JAVA**

M. Thohar al-Abza

Postgraduate of Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, Indonesia

LAIN Fatabul Muluk Papua, Indonesia

hyangtoh0@gmail.com

Kamsi

UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta, Indonesia

kamsi@uin-suka.ac.id

Nawari Ismail

Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, Indonesia

nwrismaiel@yahoo.com

Abstract

*Tarekat teaches its followers not to glorify conglomerates, to keep their distance from leader, and to live in a way of *zuhud*, including in the matters of politics. But the Tarekat Qādiriyah wa Naqsyabandiyah in Cukir Jombang was actually involved in practical politics as a supporter of Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP). This paper, which was written in the form of ethnographic design according to the concept of the power relations of Foucault to find new perspectives about the actions of Tarekat communities in politics, in this case explaining the pattern of relations that occurred between the Tarekat Cukir and PPP and discovering the factors causing Tarekat Cukir to support PPP. This paper concludes that between Tarekat Cukir and PPP, there is a mutually beneficial pattern of relations in terms of proximity, but in terms of economic politics, the Tarekat Cukir feels disadvantaged. The dominant*

reason the Tarekat Cukir supports PPP is because of the dependence of Santri on their Mursyid who is a PPP politician. This is reinforced by the history between the two parties and the spiritual ties that connect the teachers who are both PPP politicians and Santris.

[Tarekat mengajarkan kepada pengikutnya agar tidak mengagungkan konglomerat, menjaga jarak dengan pejabat dan aparat, dan hidup zuhud termasuk dalam urusan politik. Tetapi Tarekat Qādiriyah wa Naqsyabandiyah Cukir (Tarekat Cukir) Jombang justru terlibat aktif dalam politik praktis sebagai pendukung Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP). Artikel hasil riset etnografi ini—meminjam pendekatan relasi kuasa Foucault—mengkaji tentang pola relasi yang terjadi antara Tarekat Cukir dengan PPP dan mencari latar belakang bagaimana relasi tersebut bisa terjadi. Artikel ini menyimpulkan bahwa antara Tarekat Cukir dan PPP terjadi pola relasi yang saling menguntungkan (simbiosis mutualisme) dari sisi keTarekatan, sedangkan sebaliknya dari sisi politik-ekonomi, para jamaah Tarekat Cukir merasa dirugikan. Penyebab dominan Tarekat Cukir mendukung PPP karena adanya ketergantungan Santri terhadap Mursyidnya yang merupakan politisi PPP. Hal ini diperkuat adanya ikatan historis kedua belah pihak dan ikatan rohani yang menghubungkan antara guru Mursyid yang politisi PPP dengan para Santrinya].

Keywords: *Tarekat Cukir, PPP, Power Relations.*

Introduction

Tarekat is the name given to a Muslim community usually in the order of *Sufism*. *Tarekat Qādiriyah wa Naqsyabandiyah* is a local *Tarekat* developed by Sheikh Ahmad Khathib as-Sambasy from Sambas, Kalimantan. By the contribution of the three representatives (Caliphs): Abdul Karim from Banten, Ahmad Tholhah from Cirebon and Muhammad Hasbullah from Madura,¹ *Tarekat Qādiriyah wa Naqsyabandiyah* were spread widely throughout in the Nusantara. Mashar stated that one of *Tarekat Qādiriyah*

¹ A. Aziz Masyhuri, *Ensiklopedi 22 Aliran Tarekat dalam Tasawuf* (Surabaya: Imtiyaz, 2014), p. 225-234.

wa Naqsyabandiyah whose development was quite rapid was located in the village of Cukir (*Tarekat* Cukir) Jombang, East Java.² *Tarekat* Cukir was originally a branch of *Tarekat Qādiriyah wa Naqsyabandiyah* Rejoso (*Tarekat* Rejoso), who then took steps to separate and establish it independently.³

Tarekat Cukir traditionalizes the ritual of reading the *Kitāb Manāqib*, a book about the greatness of Sheikh ‘Abdu’l Qādir al-Jilānī which teaches the *Tarekat* not to glorify the conglomerates, and keep their distance from leader of government.⁴ *Tarekat* Cukir also teaches the congregation to focus on the affairs of the here after, closer to Allah to the level of *al-iḥ s̄ān*.⁵ They are also taught to live in the way of *zuhud*,⁶ away from worldly matters, including political matters. On the other hand, *Tarekat* Cukir, which was founded in 1978, is actively involved in practical politics as a strong supporter of the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) until now. In fact, *Tarekat* Cukir is also related to Jombang District Leader, and is involved in political affairs to support one of the candidates in the 2018 Jombang Regency Leader Election.

Tarekat Cukir continues to be a strong follower of PPP in both eras, *Orde Baru* and *Reformasi*. In fact, according to LIPI research, PPP has recently been seen as a political party that is not “promising” in the future, compared to other political parties that were born later such as Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS), Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB), and

² Aly Mashar, “Genealogi dan Penyebaran Thariqah Qadiriyyah wa Naqsyabandiyah di Jawa”, *Al-A’raf*, Vol. XIII, No. 2, 2016.

³ Sukanto, *Kepemimpinan Kiai dalm Pesantren* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1999).

⁴ Muṣliḥ bin ‘Abd al-Raḥmān, *Al-Nūru’l Burhānī* (Semarang: Karya Toha Putera, 1422), p. 47.

⁵ It means “you worship God as if you saw him, and even if you do not see him, he actually sees you”. Al-Bukhāri, *al-Jāmi’ al-Ṣaḥīḥ al-Mukhtaṣar* (Beirut: Dār Ibnī Kathīr, 1987), p. 27.

⁶ *Zuhud* is the term used when someone is staying away from worldly matters because they have the knowledge that the world is low and inglorious when compared to the after life. Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, *Iḥyā’ ‘Ulūm al-Dīn*, Juz III (Beirut: Dār al-Naḥḍ ah al-‘Arabiyah, 1998), p. 313-315.

Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN).⁷ The image of PPP got worse with the capture of two important PPP figures by the Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK), i.e. Surya Dharma Ali and Romahurmuzy. With such conditions, *Tarekat* Cukir could shift its support to PKB which has the same grassroots: community of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), but they still supports PPP.

However, in historical dynamics, there was a fluctuating relationship between NU and PPP. In the NU Congress in Situbondo 1984 resulted a decision to returned to the 1926 *khittah*, in the sense that NU no longer practiced politics. This disillusioned PPP and impacted the heat of relations between actors within *Tarekat* Cukir internally, although in the end, they became the basis of PPP followers. In the case of the 2013 Jombang Regent Election, both parties compactly supported the candidate they were carrying. But in the 2018 Jombang Regent Election case, both parties were involved in a conflict because of differing views on the candidate for regent. The PPP carries its own candidate, while *Tarekat* Cukir escorts and supports an incumbent from Golkar. Then the two were involved in a conflict, but *Tarekat* Cukir still could not be separated from PPP.

The example of the case above appearance an indication of pulling from both parties, each party influencing each other, trying to dominate, even reinforcing or mutually contradicting, as explained by Foucault as a power relation.⁸ Power here is understood as a complex strategy in a society with certain equipment, maneuvers, techniques, and mechanisms. Clearly, power can be said to be more operational than possessed. Power is not a privilege obtained or maintained by the dominant class, but is a

⁷ Moch. Nurhasim (ed.), “Stagnasi Electoral Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP)”, *Masa depan Partai Islam di Indonesia: Studi tentang Volatilitas Electoral dan Faktor-Faktor Penyebabnya* (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar & LIPI, 2016), p. 194.

⁸ Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interview and Other Writings 1972-1977* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), p. 141-142.

result of its overall strategic position.⁹

This paper presents a study of *Tarekat* Cukir to complement the description of the development of it in relation to the politics in Indonesia. This is related to the importance of examining the impact of globalization on Islamic discourse and movements in Indonesia today.¹⁰ Moreover, the existence of local Islam in the era of globalization is in a global village network. The world is just the same as a village, which becomes a meeting place for various socio-cultural aspects.¹¹ It affects the abating of geographic obstacles between countries and also has implications for the opening of social and religious resistance.

Studies on the theme of political *Tarekat* have been carried out by some researchers. Chabib focuses on internal politics between *Santri*¹² and *Mursyid*,¹³ and not discussing their relations with other political communities. Mu'min,¹⁴ examines the profile of the elite *Tarekat Qādiriyah wa Naqsyabandiyah* in Kudus who became a strong follower of the Golkar party during the *Orde Baru*. But he did not explain the character of their relationship. While, the examination of Ziadi¹⁵ is focusing on the practice of *Sufism* political *Tarekat Nahdlatul Wathan* in Lombok which is principally based on the concept of *maslahah*, and does not discuss its relationship with political parties.

⁹ Haryatmoko, *Membongkar Rezim Kepastian: Pemikiran Kritis Post-Strukturalis* (Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 2016), p. 15.

¹⁰ Martin Van Bruinessen, *Kitab Kuning, Pesantren, dan Tarekat* (Yogyakarta: Gading Publishing: 2015), p. vi.

¹¹ James Beckford and Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Changing Face of Religion* (London: Sage Publication, 1991), p. 11.

¹² The *Santri* are people in Javanese who practice a more orthodox version of Islam.

¹³ *Mursyid* is a spiritual guide in *Sufism*. Chabib Musthofa, "Relasi Mursyid dan Murid dalam Bimbingan Tarekat Shadiliyah di Pesulukan Tarekat Agung Tulungagung", *Teosofi*, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2017.

¹⁴ Ma'mun Mu'min, "Pergumulan Tarekat dan Politik; Peranan Kiai Haji Muhammad Shiddiq dalam Tarekat dan Politik di Kudus, *Fikrah*," Vol. 2, No. 1, 2014.

¹⁵ M. Rohman Ziadi, "Tarekat dan Politik; Studi Living Sufisme Tarekat Hizib Nahdlatul Wathan", *Living Islam*, Vol. I, No. 2, 2018.

The study of the *Tarekat* community that supports certain candidates in the General Election was conducted by Arsyad,¹⁶ Sadri, et.al.,¹⁷ and Setiyawati.¹⁸ None of these writings indicate a relationship with a political party. However, there are at least some motivations underlying the *Tarekat* to support certain candidates. *First*, preaching for good. *Second*, kinship between the elite. *Third*, regional relations. *Fourth*, personal interests in the form of material (economy).

While the study of political *Tarekat* in Jombang appearance some motivation. Nur Syam's study focused on the views of the *jamaah* about the affiliation between *Tarekat* Cukir and PPP. Nur Syam's writing resulted that choosing PPP for *Tarekat* Cukir is an *ijtimā'ī* requirement.¹⁹ While the some researchers focused on how the relations between the two communities worked. Endang Turmudi studies *Kiai's* leadership in East Java. This study is too broad, so it requires a more specific discussion.²⁰ Sujuthi studies about three *Tarekat* communities in Jombang, especially *Tarekat* Rejoso, *Tarekat* Kedinding Lor and *Tarekat* Cukir, in their relation to the state and society.²¹ This paper is still a preliminary understanding of *Tarekat's* third work in relation to political parties and their response to the *Orde Baru* government. In addition, the text does not focus on one *Tarekat*. Bruinessen, in his revised edition did not add new information about *Tarekat* Cukir, he only added two papers about

¹⁶ Muhammad Armin Arsyad and M. Basyir Syam, "Preferensi Politik Pengikut Tarekat Qadiriyyah di Majene dalam Pemilu Kabupatn Majene Tahun 2011", *Adabiyah*, Vol. XIV, No. 1, 2014.

¹⁷ Sadri Chaniago, et.al., "Elit Tarekat dalam Pusaran Kontestasi Pilkada; Dukungan Politik Tuanku Tarekat Syathariyyah terhadap Kandidat pada Pilkada Sumbar Tahun 2010", *9th International Conference on Malaysia-Indonesia Relations (PAHMI 9) Faculty of Social Sciences*, Yogyakarta: Universitas Negeri Yogyakarta, 2015.

¹⁸ Elen Setiyawati, "Tarekat Naqsabandiyah dalam Ranah Politik Lokal", *Demokrasi & Otonomi Daerah*, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2017.

¹⁹ Nur Syam, *Pembangkangan Kaum Tarekat* (Surabaya: Lepkiss, 2004).

²⁰ Endang Turmudi, *Struggling for the Ulama: Changing Leadership Roles of Kiai in Jombang, East Java* (Canberra: ANU E Press, 1996).

²¹ Mahmud Sujuthi, *Politik Tarekat Qadiriyyah wa Naqsyabandiyah Jombang; Hubungan Agama, Negara dan Masyarakat* (Yogyakarta: Galang Press, 2001).

the Islamic movement.²² Of the four writings, all of them were written in the the era of *Orde Baru*, so there needs to be a new study of *Tarekat Cukir* so that there is no disconnection of information and knowledge.

Some of the studies above have not linked it with power relation theory, because it is a theory that developed in the socio-political sciences. This theory sees mans not merely as objects affected by structure, but also has the freedom and even determines structure. Therefore, in its relations with other parties, mans are active, creative, and even manipulative agents oriented towards their self-interest. Everyone is equally exercising power to achieve excellence, even though in the process of exercising that power there is someone who is superior and “loses” or succumbs, but is only temporary.²³ Because power is dynamic and it does not belong to certain elites, but exercised by all individuals and it produces something real, produces fields and rites of truth. Individuals and knowledge continue the production.²⁴

The Genealogy of Power Relations

The term of “power” in this paper is defined by Foucault as, *first*, various kinds of power relations, which are immanent in the field of power relations that apply, and are the forming elements and their organizations. *Second*, a game which by the way of endless struggle changes, strengthens, and turns it around. *Third*, the various power relations that support each other so as to form a series or system, disparity, and contradictions that isolate each other. *Fourth*, the strategy by which power relations have an impact, and its general design or crystallization within institutions manifest in the state apparatus, the formulation of the law, and social hegemony.²⁵

²² Martin Van Bruinessen, *Kitab Kuning, Pesantren...*

²³ Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge...*, p. 141-142.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p.133.

²⁵ Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, Vol. I (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), p. 92-93.

Power and knowledge cannot be separated, because truth/knowledge is never outside of power or does not have power, but rather to be in power. Thus, there are no power relations that are not related to the formation of a field of knowledge, and there is no knowledge that does not presuppose and at the same time form a power relationship. The knowledge that continues to give birth to the effect of the power of knowledge, is nothing but a relation of power itself.²⁶ Moreover, knowledge itself is something that is seen as true by certain communities of people, and with certain strategies, the actors build trust through language, scientific discourse and the institutions that produce it, and “force” others to accept it.

The Dependence of *Santri* toward the *Mursyid*

Tarekat Cukir's choice of PPP cannot be separated from the power relations that happened internally within the community. *Tarekat* Cukir is a reproduction institution of knowledge, including *Tarekat* knowledge in the form of manners governing the *Mursyid* and *Santri* according to their position and their relation, as stated in the guidance book of *Tarekat*.²⁷ Reproduction of knowledge is usually conveyed at events on a smaller scale, specifically in their respective areas through the Caliph.²⁸ So that the program “*Senenan*” which is held once a week at the *Tarekat* Cukir, no longer discusses the material. These manners are made to reconstruct and normalize individuals through discipline and control which aims to create *Santri* who are obedient to the authorities and are willing to accept social and spiritual control. Then, obedient will eventually lead to power.²⁹ The emergence of a civilized relation system, *Santri* will know that submission

²⁶ Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of The Prison* (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), p. 27.

²⁷ Aboe Bakar Atjeh, *Pengantar Ilmu Tarekat: Uraian Tentang Mistik* (Jakarta: FA. HM. Tawi and Son, 1966), p. 65-76.

²⁸ Interview with Kasmuri on June 14, 2018 in Mojoagung Jombang. Kasmuri is one of the officials of that afterwards become an official of PPP.

²⁹ Haryatmoko, *Membongkar Rezim Kepastian...*, p. 24.

and obedience to *Mursyid* is one way to achieve their goals.

For *Mursyid*, self-discipline and normalizing the etiquette is intended so that he has a character similar to the Muhammad SAW, both in spiritual and behavior. As for *Santri*, it is intended to have a character similar to the companions of the him. The relationship between *Mursyid* and *Santri* is assumed to be a relationship between the *Sahabat*³⁰ and Muhammad SAW. *Kiai* Mad, during the procession of *baiat*,³¹ explained that the sitting position was like the *tahiyāt akhīr* position in *salat*.³² The explanation is repeated every time because in Monday there is sure to be a new *jamaah*, and that must be explained. This has implications for the attitude of the *jamaah* towards *Mursyid* as politely as possible, as the attitude of the *Sahabat* towards the figure of Muhammad SAW.

The *Santri* also believe that *Mursyid* knows and always controls *Santri* everyday, including the routine of *zikir*.³³ The *Santri* always feels that his *Mursyid* is present in themselves, especially when carrying out *rābiṭah* which is performed after *salat*. *Rābiṭah* is an activity who connects self to the spiritual of *Mursyid*, and then connects to Allah SWT.³⁴ This activity can be social and spiritual control for *Santri*. Likewise, for the *Mursyid*, he always felt supervised by his deceased *Mursyid*. *Kiai* Mad, told about his mystical experience, in an activity to *baiat*, he saw the deceased *Kiai* Adlan Aly also present for watching. Besides being supervised by his deceased *Mursyid*, they also feel always watched by Allah SWT.³⁵ In other words, every gesture of *Santri* and *Mursyid* are not spared from monitoring and controlling both of them.

³⁰ *Sahabat* is one who saw the prophet Muhammad and believed in him and died as a Muslim.

³¹ *Baiat* is an agreement to give obedience.

³² Interview with *Kiai* Mad, on October 15, 2018 in the Great Mosque of Cukir Jombang. *Kiai* Mad or *Kiai* Ahmad Sholihudin is a *Rais* and also a *Mursyid* in *Tarekat* Cukir.

³³ *Zikir* is a way to remember all the greatness and power of Allah.

³⁴ Interview with *Kiai* Mad, on October 15, 2018.

³⁵ *Ibid*.

This relation is seen as a tradition that has survived from one generation to another generation as a form of practice of *Sababat* who depend on the Muhammad SAW's guidance at the time. In this case, the courtesy of a *Santri* to *Mursyid* is manifested in a true love.³⁶

The love of *Santris* of *Tarekat* Cukir for their *Mursyid* manifests in the form of obedience which results in spiritual and social behavior. Spiritual obedience, seen in their obedience in doing spiritual, such as *zikir jabr* and *zikir sirr* according to the *Mursyid's* instructions. While, social obedience manifests in the form of their tendency towards PPP as the message or will of the deceased *Mursyid*. In this case, Kiai Maftuh explained, Kiai Adlan had advised the *jamaah* to vote for PPP, provided the party existed. Conversely, if the PPP no longer exists, the *jamaah* is advised to vote another party as long as it is based on Islam.³⁷

Kiai Maftuh also practices compliance by actively participating in PKB. But by his father he was ordered to return to PPP. According to Kiai Maftuh, the order was personally, there were no specific orders for *jamaah* to follow him.³⁸

The founders of the *Tarekat* Cukir were people who had militancy to PPP.³⁹ In this context, Kiai Makki Ma'shoem—a *Mursyid* of *Tarekat* Cukir—once argued in the Congress of *Jam'iyah Ablith Thoriqoh Al-Mu'tabaroh An-Nahdliyyah*) JATMAN XX (2000) in Pekalongan. He said that *Santri's* obedience to his *Mursyid* was not only religious but also political matters. It's problem arises because of the new reality of socio-political developments in Indonesia as a result of *Reformasi* policies marked by freedom of expression. As a result, many new parties with Islamic labels, such as PKB and PKS. PKB was also formed as a forum

³⁶ 'Abd al-Wahhāb Al-Sya'rāni, *Al-Anwār al-Qudsiyyah fī Ma'rifati Qawā'idī's Ṣūfiyyah* (Jakarta: Dinamika Berkah Utama, t.t.), p. 114.

³⁷ Interview with Kiai Maftuh, on July 11, 2018 in Tegalsari Mojowarno Jombang. Kiai Maftuh is a *mudir* and also a *Badal Mursyid* at *Tarekat* Cukir.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ Nur Syam, *Pembangkangan Kaum Tarekat...*; Mahmud Sujuthi, *Politik Tarekat Qadiriyyah wa Naqsyabandiyah Jombang...*

for the political aspirations of NU communities. While PPP, which also has a mass base of NU, is increasingly marginalized. It's a difference not only supported by the factors of religious arguments but also supported by the political interests of the parties on the debate.

The parties who supported the opinion about the obligation of a *Santri* to follow the political choices of his *Murysid* were *Kiai* Abdurrahman Badawi from *Tarekat* Mranggen (Demak). Meanwhile, prominent figures in supporting the opinion that *Santri* are not required to attend *Murysid* in political affairs are *Kiai* Muhaimin Gunardo from Temanggung, and *Kiai* Jufri from Jember. The political interests of each party are striking, because both are active in different political parties. *Kiai* Makki Ma'shoem and *Kiai* Abdurrahman Badawi were active in PPP, while *Kiai* Muhaimin Gunardo was a PKB activist.⁴⁰

The opinion of *Kiai* Makki Ma'shoem is applied indecisively in the *Kiai* Maftuh Makki era. Political choice matters are left to the individual of *Santri* and *Murysid* cannot force individual political rights to them. *Kiai* Adlan once explained about his existence at PPP, if only the *Santri* were wanted to keep meeting him.⁴¹

In the current context, if the *jamaah* of *Tarekat* Cukir wishes to preserve their spiritual relationship with *Kiai* Adlan, they should be voting for PPP. This statement was also confirmed by *Kiai* Maftuh, if *Santri* had different choices with *Murysid*, including in politics, his spiritual relationship could be disconnected. The basis of this belief is sourced from the book of *manaqib* about the history of the greatness of Sheikh 'Abdu'l-Qādir al-Jīlāni: "*wa'l-mukbālafat sababu'l-firāq.*"⁴²

In different language, *Kiai* AA said that choosing PPP was in accordance with *Kiai* 'Adlan Aly's message as one of the founders of the

⁴⁰ M. Muhsin Jamil, *Tarekat dan Dinamika Sosial Politik: Tafsir Sosial Sufi Nusantara* (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2005), p. 122-123.

⁴¹ Interview with *Kiai* Maftuh, on July 01, 2018 in Tegalsari Mojowarno Jombang.

⁴² Different from the *Murysid* is the cause of the disconnected spiritual relationship. The informant does not want his name to be mentioned in this paper.

Tarekat Cukir and PPP activist. He said as long as the PPP is based on Islam it must be sustained. However, if there is a shortage at the party, there is no need to leave it, instead, it must enter to correct it.⁴³

Its doctrine is gradually reproduced as a cooperation contract, so that *Santri* always obeys his *Mursyid* including in the political field. The result was the message of the *Mursyid* founder of the *Tarekat* Cukir so that the *jamaah* choose PPP to be understood rigidly so that the political choice referred to the PPP.⁴⁴ Furthermore, at this time, *jamaah* seeks to do so by choosing PPP as respect and obedience.

Tarekat Cukir has two *Mursyids* who used to *baiat*, namely *Kiai* Mad as *Mursyid* and *Kiai* Maftuh as a substitute for *Mursyid* if the main *Mursyid* is unable to come, and both of them has a different habit. *Kiai* Mad is more concerned to spiritual matters; *da'wah* to young community and inviting them to *zikir*. *Kiai* Mad also carried out *baiat* and *kebususiyah* routines in his village of Brangkal. He has wisdom, *ruqyah*, and other mystical abilities. He distanced from politics, even though he was part of PPP.

In contrast, *Kiai* Maftuh was often involved in political activities, starting to be a member of the Dewan Pengurus Cabang (DPC) and the Dewan Pengurus Wilayah (DPW) PPP Jombang. *Kiai* Maftuh also appeared as an expert in spiritual cultivation. Many people come to share about family problems to find a solution to him. Spiritual guidance, in the form of *murāqabah*, was also carried out in his house Mojowarno, mainly on Monday before he left for Cukir to attend the “*Senenan*” routine.

The different political interests of the two *Mursyids* affect the political attitude of the *jamaah*. Some of them are of the view that they are neutral towards political affairs and prioritize the affairs of eschatologies. It's a reflection of *Kiai* Mad's attitude in politics. Neutral—in this context—is defined as not focusing too much on political matters.

⁴³ Interview with *Kiai* AA on July 11, 2018. *Kiai* AA is a politician of PPP Jombang which then pledged allegiance with *Tarekat* Cukir, and afterwards promoted to be one of the leaders in *Tarekat* Cukir for *ghusniyah*.

⁴⁴ Nur Syam, *Pembangkangan Kaum Tarekat*...

As revealed by Sunari, a *jamaah* who came from Kediri for “*Senenan*” event at the Cukir Great Mosque, that his participation in *Tarekat* was to closer Allah SWT.⁴⁵

Some of them are interested in political affairs, as a reflection of the behavior of *Kiai* Maftuh who is often involved in practical politics. But in general, political matters are seen as private matters. The *jamaah* is believed to have understood that political affairs have become a private domain. This opinion is also reinforced by Gus H,⁴⁶ as an part of *Tarekat* Cukir and PPP in Jombang. He said the *Tarekat* affair was more important than the temporal political affair.⁴⁷

Based on the description above, it can be understood that the *Santris*’ obedience to the *Mursyid* in the *Tarekat* Cukir is solely to obtain the spiritual virtues. Therefore, even though the *Mursyid* politically tends to PPP, the *jamaah* also follow him. This is a form of obedience and efforts to connect *spiritual* between *Santri* and *Mursyid* even though it is not explicitly required.

The Will to Dominate

In 2008, *Tarekat* Cukir out from JATMAN member. *Kiai* Maftuh proposed *Tarekat* Cukir as an independent institution called “*Thoriqoh al-Mu’tabaroh Qodiriyah wa Naqsyabandiyah an Nabdliyah*”, and was legally registered under the Ministry of Law and Human Rights in 2016.

In political tendencies, the nine founders of *Tarekat* Cukir active in PPP Jombang. In other words, *Tarekat* Cukir foundation dominated not only *Tarekat* but also participant of PPP. The total 38 committee of the *Tarekat*, 81% were dominated by PPP, the rest come from PKB,

⁴⁵ Interview with Sunari, on October 15, 2018 in the Great Mosque of Cukir Jombang. He is one of the *jamaah* and does not have any position, both in *Tarekat* Cukir and in PPP.

⁴⁶ The informant does not want his identity to be revealed.

⁴⁷ Interview with Gus H on June 06, 2019. He is one of leader of *Tarekat* Cukir which then also became the official of PPP.

academic and neutral backgrounds.⁴⁸

Historically, the process of establishing the *Tarekat* Cukir in 1978 was inseparable from the *jamaah* whose PPP minded. Since 1978, the dominance of the PPP to *Tarekat* Cukir has proceeded as a strategy to withstand the pressure of the *Orde Baru* through a de-ideologization program and the abolishment of political parties. It has forced Islamic parties to be merged into one party: PPP.⁴⁹ Meanwhile, Golkar, which is supported by the authorities, with all of its strategies was able to seize some of the *Tarekat* community which actually had been strongly supported by the people who initially supported the PPP. It seems to have made the NU community in PPP play their strategy to survive by forming a rival *Tarekat* community in Cukir village. The *jamaah* of this *Tarekat* mostly come from *Tarekat* Rejoso, who does not want to join Golkar. The PPP played out its strategy by persuading NU whose loyalty to PPP was undoubted, and knowledge of *Tarekat* is reputable. There was an official letter from the NU Jombang number 2095/Kpts/Tanf/B-I/1978 regarding the formation of the “*Thoriqot Al-Mu’tabaroh*” a branch of the Jombang. The letter was signed by KH. Najib Wahab as the first Rais, H. Mochammad Baidlowi as the Chairperson, and Drs. Hafidh Ma’shoem as the Secretary.⁵⁰ It means, *Tarekat* Cukir has been dominated by the members of PPP since its birth, and public calls it as *Tarekat* PPP.

After *Orde Baru*, PPP played its strategy by including seniors in the *Tarekat* Cukir as management at PPP or vice versa. Such as, *Kiai* AA, which was active in PPP, and *baiat* in *Tarekat* Cukir later. He was appointed as management of *Tarekat* Cukir in *Idārah Ghusniyah*, the sub-district level.⁵¹

⁴⁸ The tendency of following a party based on the statement of *Kiai* Maftuh, and a cross check to Decree of Officials of PPP Jombang.

⁴⁹ Fachry Ali and Bachtiar Efendy, *Merambah Jalan Baru Islam* (Jakarta: Mizan, 1985), p. 95.

⁵⁰ Interview with Hafidh Ma’shoem on February 09, 2018 in Jagalan Jombang. He is a senior politician of PPP that is involved in founding *Tarekat* Cukir.

⁵¹ Interview with *Kiai* AA....

The dominance of PPP is a symbolic violence. Although by some *jamaah* considered something natural happens. Because according to them, the suggestion to choose PPP as a testament to the Islamic struggle.

However, it is undeniable that there are efforts to change made by *Kiai* Maftuh. He tried to present himself differently from the previous generation by choosing to be active as PKB management. Despite in the end, he was forced to out and include the management of PPP because pressure from his father.⁵²

According to Gus JS, the influence of PPP on *Tarekat* Cukir is historical heritage. The historical heritage, not only reproduced by the internal *Tarekat* Cukir, but also the PPP. In political perspective, PPP does not want the *Tarekat* Cukir to be separated from the influence of PPP. The reason is to preserve history and to assign clerics above executive management, because he is the heirs of the struggle of the prophets.⁵³

In conclusion, the dominance of PPP in the management of the *Tarekat* Cukir, on one hand, is an effort to bring them closer to the practice of *Sufism*, but on the other hand, it also causes the image of the *Tarekat* to be political. This finding reinforces the theory domination is not constant, but it is dynamic, as the basic character of power is diffuse.⁵⁴

The Domination of Non-*Tarekat* PPP in the Legislative

During the *Orde Baru*, both of members of PPP and *Tarekat* Cukir were active in the DPR and DPRD, such as, *Kiai* Syansuri Badawi, *Kiai* Adlan Aly and *Kiai* Makki Ma'shoem. This condition is different from the post-reform era, the management of the *Tarekat* Cukir was unable to get seats in the DPR and DPRD by means of PPP faction. There is only one name that was once a member of the legislature in 1999, and failed in the next period. His name is Nuryanto, *Tarekat* Cukir's secretary.

⁵² M. Muhsin Jamil, *Tarekat dan Dinamika Sosial Politik*..., p.122.

⁵³ Interview with Gus JS on July 07, 2018.

⁵⁴ Michel Foucault, *Power/ Knowledge*..., p. 133.

According to *Kiai* Maftuh, Nuryanto's election as a legislative of the PPP Jombang faction was more due to luck. He benefited from the electoral system which prioritizes the serial number. Five years later, the electoral system changed; no longer based on the serial number, but the direct selection model that further emphasizes the individual. Nuryanto volunteered as a candidate for legislative member. However, he is not known among the public, both internally in the *Tarekat* Cukir and outside. He is better known for his signature than his personality. Nuryanto cannot play his strategy to gain the dominance of votes in legislative elections. Finally, he lost and did not get a seat in the legislative.⁵⁵

Politics is a battle for positions between PPP *Tarekat* and Non *Tarekat*. But, *Kiai* Maftuh countered it and said prefers to focus on the spiritual quality of the *jamaah*.⁵⁶ Gus JS also stated that there was no competition between the two parties. According to him, party rules free members and even outside members to nominate themselves as candidates from the PPP. But in fact, from among the PPP members themselves many do not register as legislative candidates, due to the lack of capital that they have.⁵⁷

Kiai Maftuh, as a leader of *Tarekat* Cukir, could nominate himself as a member of the council. Moreover, he could take advantage of charisma his father's name, namely *Kiai* Makki Ma'shoem who is famous for his militancy as a PPP politician. However, *Kiai* Maftuh was not interested in getting involved in the struggle for legislative, even he felt more comfortable as a *Kiai Tarekat*.⁵⁸

There are at least two main factors both internal and external, why no one of the *Tarekat* Cukir leaders is interested in winning legislative seats lately. *First*, they want to prioritize the affairs of the hereafter and focus more on improving the spiritual quality of their *jamaah*. *Second*,

⁵⁵ Interview with *Kiai* Maftuh...

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ Interview with Gus JS....

⁵⁸ Interview with *Kiai* Maftuh....

weakening economic capital. *Third*, the quality of his human resources, including the interest of the *Mursyid*, which is sharper in his closeness than his political instincts.

While external factors, namely the increasingly open competition because party policy provides an opportunity for anyone to register as a legislative candidate even though he is not a PPP cadre. Mental readiness and economic capital are important for the means to advance to become legislative candidates, and this is what the non-*Tarekat* PPP people present.

Resistances and Conflicts

Kiai Maftuh assume the relationship between *Tarekat* Cukir and PPP as a coincidence.⁵⁹ He was consciously dominated by PPP, therefore he struggled to reverse it or strengthen his position as a spiritual community based on politics based on Islamic teachings and under certain conditions could not be intervened by politics. *Tarekat* Cukir exercised his power by rejecting the female Regent candidate nominated by PPP in the 2018 Jombang Regent Election. In this case, *Kiai* Maftuh actually escorted and supported the incumbent candidate of the Jombang Regent from a Golkar party. Whereas PPP has agreed to bring its members forward as one of the candidates, while the presence of *Kiai* Maftuh himself is active management of PPP. Gus JS stated, *Kiai* Maftuh's action was no resistance, but a lack of understanding of the party mechanism. In other words, his actions were based on the message he took from Islamic teachings, while Gus JS was based on political interests.

Mundjidah, a district leader candidate is the daughter of KH. Wahab Hasbullah from Tambak Beras Jombang, which was carried by PPP. She has indeed been active in Ikatan Pelajar Puteri Nahdlatul Ulama (IPPNU). Previously, she was active in DPW PPP East Java (SK. DPW PPP East Java 2016). However, *Kiai* Maftuh did not support her for several reasons. *First*, individually Mundjidah never made the slightest

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

contribution to the *Tarekat* Cukir. *Second*, the *Tarekat* Cukir has never received significant contributions from PPP organizations.⁶⁰ This is reinforced by what was said by Hafidh Ma'shoem that the PPP had never provided material assistance to the *Tarekat* Cukir community.⁶¹ *Third*, carrying female candidates is contrary to the ideology adopted by *Tarekat* Cukir: namely choosing female leaders is not permitted in the Islam.⁶²

To reinforce his argument, *Kiai* Maftuh quoted religious propositions, from the general meaning of the *hadith* Bukhari's about the history of women's leadership. It's commonly used as an interpretation of verses of Qur'an Surat Al-Nisa': 34. For *Kiai* Maftuh, this was the truth was used as the basis for choosing the regent in the 2018 Jombang Regent Election. Some of the *jamaah Tarekat* Cukir also acknowledged that they preferred leaders from among men, they did not care about win-lose, the most important thing for them was choose male candidates because of the intention to obey Allah SWT.

The gender factor, as revealed by *Kiai* Maftuh, was denied by PPP because it was seen as having weaknesses. Gus JS stated that there was another factor behind *Kiai* Maftuh's refusal.⁶³ Hafidh Ma'shoem explained the existence of a previous "giving material" factor from incumbent candidates.⁶⁴ For Gus JS, the weak point of *Kiai* Maftuh's argument lies in his commitment in escorting and supporting the Nyono Suharli-Mundjidah pair in the 2013 Jombang Regent Election. Because, the male regent was unable to attend, of course, the one who replaced him would be the female regent representative,⁶⁵ and it is proven that when the regent was caught by the KPK, Mundjidah automatically replaced him as regent.

Regarding this criticism, especially related to the issue of moral duty, *Kiai* Maftuh played his strategy by silence. Yet the problem of

⁶⁰ Interview with *Kiai* Maftuh on February 27, 2018.

⁶¹ Interview with Hafidh Ma'shoem, on February 09, 2018.

⁶² Interview with *Kiai* Maftuh...

⁶³ Interview with Gus JS...

⁶⁴ Interview with Hafidh Ma'shoem...

⁶⁵ Interview with Gus JS, Saturday...

“property” for the *Tarekat* is still seen as taboo and far from the attitude of *zuhud*. *Kiai* Maftuh also seemed reluctant to explain who supported this move, both of the *Tarekat* Cukir and the PPP.⁶⁶ But from the content of the informants’ conversation, *Kiai* Ikhsan was seen supported *Kiai* Maftuh’s view.

In other words, it’s a temporal conflict between the PPP and the leader of *Tarekat* Cukir. Because PPP needs support from *Tarekat* Cukir, especially for the interests of the five-year electoral politics. While *Tarekat* Cukir also needs PPP as an effort to the will of the founders to choose PPP. It can be said, the relation between them is a mutual pattern. But, in certain conditions, for example economically and politically, it is not profitable for *Tarekat* Cukir.

Conclusion

Based on the descriptions above—in the *Tarekat* perspective—the relations between *Tarekat* Cukir and PPP are mutual. But economically, the *Tarekat* Cukir felt that they had never benefited and had been used for political purposes. Thus, the relationship between them, occurs in a process of interdependence, mutual influence, to dominate each other, and resistance to conflict.

This paper found that the factors causing *Tarekat* Cukir were voting for PPP as a channeling of their political aspirations were: *first*, *Santri* dependence on their *Murysid*. It is a spiritual relation, which if it is not carried out it is feared that will result in a disconnected in the spiritual relationship between them.

Second, the efforts to dominate another. PPP does not want the *Tarekat* Cukir to be separated from the influence of them under the pretext of historical heritage and theological factors. While, *Tarekat* Cukir is an effort to bring PPP closer to the practice of *Sufism*. This finding reinforces the power relation is not constant, but it is dynamic.

⁶⁶ Interview with *Kiai* Maftuh....

Bibliography

- Al-Bukhārī, *al-Jāmi' al-Ṣaḥīḥ al-Mukhtaṣar*, Beirut: Dār Ibnī Kathīr, 1987.
- Al-Ghazālī, Abū Ḥāmid, *Iḥyā' Ulūm al-Dīn*, Beirut: Dār al-Nahḍah al-'Arabīyyah, 1998.
- Ali, Fachry dan Efendy, Bachtiar, *Merambab Jalan Baru Islam*, Jakarta: Mizan: 1985.
- Al-Marāqī, Muṣliḥ bin 'Abd al-Raḥmān, *Al-Nūru'l Burbānī*, Semarang: Karya Toha Putera, 1422 H.
- Al-Sya'rānī, 'Abd al-Wahhāb, *Al-Awwār al-Qudsiyyah fī Ma'rifati Qawāidi's Ṣūfiyyah*, Jakarta: Dinamika Berkah Utama, t.t.
- Arsyad, Muhammad Armin and Syam, M. Basyir, "Preferensi Politik Pengikut Tarekat Qadiriyyah di Majene dalam Pemilukada Kabupaten Majene Tahun 2011", *Adabiyah*, Vol. XIV, No. 1, 2014.
- Atjeh, Aboe Bakar, *Pengantar Ilmu Tarekat; Uraian Tentang Mistik*, Djakarta: FA. HM. Tawi and Son, 1966.
- Beckford, James and Kuhn, Thomas S., *The Changing Face of Religion*, London: Sage Publication, 1991.
- Bruinessen, Martin Van, *Kitab Kuning, Pesantren, and Tarekat*, Yogyakarta: Gading Publisng: 2015.
- Chaniago, Sadri, et.al., "Elit Tarekat dalam Pusaran Kontestasi Pilkada: Dukungan Politik Tuanku Tarekat Syathariyyah Terhadap Kandidat pada Pilkada Sumbar Tahun 2010", *9th International Conference on Malaysia-Indonesia Relations (PAHMI 9) Faculty of Social Sciences*, Yogyakarta: Universitas Negeri Yogyakarta, 2015.
- Creswell, John. W, *Desain Penelitian: Pendekatan Kualitatif & Kuantitatif*, KIK Press: Jakarta, 2003.
- Foucault, Michel, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, New York: Vintage Books, 1995.

- _____, *The History of Sexuality*, Vol. I, New York: Pantheon Books, 1978.
- _____, *Power/Knowledge; Selected Interview and Other Writings 1972-1977*, New York: Pantheon Books, 1980.
- Haryatmoko, *Membongkar Rezim Kepastian: Pemikiran Kritis Post-Strukturalis*, Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 2016.
- Interview with *Gus Fuad* on October 15, 2016.
- Interview with *Gus JS* on June 12, 2018 and July 07, 2018.
- Interview with *Hafidh Ma'shoem* on February 09, 2018.
- Interview with *Kasmuri* on July 14, 2018.
- Interview with *Kiai AA*, on July 11, 2018.
- Interview with *Kiai Ahmad Sholihudin (Kiai Mad)*, on October 15, 2018.
- Interview with *Kiai Maftuh* on July 01-11 2018; February 06, 2019.
- Interview with *Sunari* on October 15, 2018.
- Jamil, M. Muhsin, *Tarekat dan Dinamika Sosial Politik; Tafsir Sosial Sufi Nusantara*, Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2005.
- Mashar, Aly, "Genealogi dan Penyebaran Thariqah Qadiriyyah wa Naqsyabandiyah di Jawa", *Al-A'RAF*, Vol. XIII, No. 2, 2016.
- Masyhuri, A. Aziz, *Ensiklopedi 22 Aliran Tarekat dalam Tasawuf*, Surabaya: Imtiyaz, 2014.
- Muhibuddin, Muhammad, "Jalan Menuju Tuhan dalam Pemikiran Kiai Jawa: Telaah Ajaran Gus Miek" *Episteme*, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2014.
- Mu'min, Ma'mun, "Pergumulan Tarekat dan Politik; Peranan Kiai Haji Muhammad Shiddiq dalam Tarekat dan Politik di Kudus", *Fikrah*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2014.
- Musthofa, Chabib, "Relasi Mursyid dan Murid dalam Bimbingan Tarekat Shadhiliyyah di Pesulukan Thoriqot Agung Tulungagung", *Teosofi*, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2017.
- Nur Syam, *Pembangkangan Kaum Tarekat*, Surabaya: Lepkiss, 2004.
- Nurhasim, Moch. (ed.), "Stagnasi Electoral Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP)", *Masa depan Partai Islam di Indonesia: Studi tentang Volatilitas Electoral dan Faktor-Faktor Penyebabnya*, Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar & LIPI, 2016.

M. Thohar Al-Abza; Kamsi; Nawari: *Power Relation*.....

Setiyawati, Elen, “Tarekat Naqsyabandiyah dalam Ranah Politik Lokal”,
Demokrasi dan Otonomi Daerah, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2017.

Sujuthi, Mahmud, *Politik Tarekat Qadiriyah wa Naqsyabandiyah Jombang: Hubungan Agama, Negara dan Masyarakat*, Yogyakarta: Galang Press, 2001.

Sukamto, *Kepemimpinan Kiai dalm Pesantren*, Jakarta: LP3ES, 1999.

Turmudi, Endang, *Strugling for the Ulama; Changing Leadership Roles of Kiai in Jombang, East Java*, Canberra: ANU E Press, 1996.

Ziadi, M. Rohman, “Tarekat dan Politik; Studi Living Sufism Tarekat Hizib Nahdlatul Wathan”, *Living Islam*, Vol. I, No. 2, 2018.