

CHAPTER II

ESTABLISHMENT OF ASEAN COMMUNITY

The time goes by as people never expect before. The wave of globalization makes everything gets shrieked and integrated one to another. The rising tremendous numbers of cooperation links nations into a bounded entity. This is the transformation coming and passing, as ASEAN does realize on the central point of changes. The dynamics in this senses is a fact that ought to be touched, unless the progress will be nothing more to see, if the response towards seems outlandish.

Taken into this point, regardless of un-unanimous looks-like criticism by noting the idea of ASEAN Community was a rhetorical aspirations which was sent into the initiation ASEAN had, the plan run to be real on ongoing days. Through the Bali Concord II (2003), together with the Plan of Action for a Security Community (2004), the Vientiane Plan of Action (2004), the ASEAN Charter (2005), and the ASEAN Blueprint for a Security Community (2009), the ASEAN members have committed to the formation of an ASEAN Community initially by 2020. Then the leaders of ASEAN hastened to put the due date five years earlier from it should be, which was going to be 2015.

The ASEAN Community is to be based on three pillars namely ASEAN Political and Security Community, ASEAN Economic Community, and ASEAN Social and Cultural Community. According to these instruments, the establishment of the ASEAN Community would lead to greater integration and stability in the region.

security cooperation to a higher plane where the members shall rely exclusively on peaceful processes in the settlement of differences and disputes.

In case of tracing back what done to make a view, the appropriate framework on the concept of regional community was explained in details while attaching some more arguments from realist and constructivist perspectives in the making of ASEAN Community. The clear path was delivered to measure the distance its persistent efforts in reaching the goal out.

A. The Basic Thinking of Regional Community

1. Understanding of Regional Community

Conceptually, the terminology of community in terms of inter state enhanced cooperation refers to a group of associated nations sharing common interests or a common heritage.¹

One of the most applied framework while talking about the form of community is from Deutsch² who formulated the concept of the security community “as a contribution to the study of possible ways in which men someday might abolish war.” Their seminal work defined a security community as “a group of people” integrated by a “sense of community,” that is, “a belief on the part of individuals in a group that they have come to

¹ Dictionary, Community, retrieved from <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/community> on 23rd February, 2011

² Karl Deutsch (ed.), Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton, 1957), p. 2

agreement on at least this one point: that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of 'peaceful change'.³

In this sense, peaceful change itself was putted on in "the resolution of social problems, normally by institutionalized procedures, without resort to large-scale physical force"⁴. According to Adler and Barnett⁵, this concept excludes not only "expectations," but also "preparation for organized violence." At the same time, however, the whole theory was somewhat distorted: now it focuses on interstate relations and the (non)use of organized violence "as a means to settle interstate disputes." The depth of the change is only rarely acknowledged.

According to Deutsch, there are two basic types of security community. Firstly, an amalgamated security community emerges when two or more previously independent political units form one larger unit with one common government or in the different language, with the merger of sovereign states into a single unit. Secondly, a pluralistic security community consists of formally independent states or in which member states maintain their sovereignty.

Giving a note to the second form of security community, Deutsch found that whenever states become integrated to the point that they have a

³ Deutsch 1957, p.5.

⁴ *ibid*

⁵ Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds.), *Security Communities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p.34.

sense of community, which in turn, creates the assurance that they will settle their differences without resorting to military conflict. He claimed that states within a security community had developed beyond a stable order; in fact, they have developed a stable peace.⁶

Referring to the factual world order, the existence of regional integration which has not led to a formal unification of sovereign states, as early postwar federalists often hoped, the condition of the making of security community obviously is indicated as pluralistic and not amalgamated security communities.

In dealing with the process of taking security community into account, Adler and Barnett identified the three phases of security community development into what security communities can be in the term of nascent, ascendant, and mature, and the mature ones can be categorized as whether loosely or tightly coupled. In a nascent security community, he considered “the minimal definitional properties and no more: a transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change”.⁷ In a mature security community, he unveiled a “mutual aid” aspect and “a system of rule that lies somewhere between a sovereign state and a regional centralized government; that is, it is something of a

post-sovereign system, endowed with common supranational, transnational, and national institutions and some form of a collective security system".⁸

2. The Idea of Regional Community in the Perspective of Neo-realism

Neo-realism is embedded in systemic theory to analyze the phenomenon of regionalism in the recent development of international relations. It constructs the significant degree of broader political structure within the region and the implication of having external power around with given the anarchical and conflictual nature of the international system, neo-realism seeks to explain why states cooperate at regional level. Neo-realism underlines the importance of regional configurations of power, the dynamics of power political competition, and the constraining role of the international political system.⁹ Regional groupings basically emerge in response to outside challenges. Indeed, Neo-realism studies regionalism from the outside in.

Neo-realism, tends to be very sceptical of regionalism and largely sees meaningful regional projects as some form or the other of alliance building and argues that regional groupings, as noted before, are predominantly formed by states in response to an external security threat.¹⁰ Instead of perceive the notion of regionalism and its significant appearance, Neo-realism considers the dismissal of regionalism as an independent phenomenon.

⁸ *ibid*

⁹ Louise Fawcett, and Andrew Hurrell (eds), *Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International Order* (Oxford: OUP, 1997), p.45

¹⁰ Edward D. Mansfield and Helen V. Milner, *The Political Economy of Regionalism: An Overview* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), p. 592.

Neo-realism, however, produced a regionalist offspring, intergovernmentalism, an integration theory that assumes that states are in control of the process and regional institutions merely facilitate regional cooperation and decision-making and argues that the process of integration is driven by top policy elites that engage in high-level political bargains aimed at maximizing national power.¹¹ Hence, intergovernmentalism sees regionalism as a direct result of "state driven cooperative projects that emerge as a result of intergovernmental dialogue and treaties",¹² and regional integration as the most advanced manifestation of this.

According to Neo-realism states only participate in regional integration to avoid relative losses that result from shifts in the global distribution of power. Moreover, it asserts that international cooperation is extremely hard to achieve simply because states are too preoccupied with survival and relative gains and hence, it does not concern itself with attempting to explain the problem of this investigation.

To sum up what are basically the ideas carried by Neo-realism on power-oriented interpretations of regionalism, Hurrell¹³ composes such theoretical assumptions below:

¹¹ This Classical Intergovernmentalism concept passage was inspired by the work of Stanley Hoffmann (1966). Then it differed from the liberal approach developed by Andrew Moravcsik which merely made the domestic economics as power transfer reason in bold.

¹² Breslin, Shaun and Richard Higgott (2000), "Studying Regions: Learning from the Old, Constructing the

New", *New Political Economy*, Vol.5, Issue 3, p. 344

¹³ Hurrell (1995), p. 50

- a. sub-regional groupings often develop as a response to the existence of an actual or potential hegemonic power;
- b. regionalism reflects a strategy of bandwagoning on the part of the weaker states in a region; and
- c. hegemon themselves may promote regional institutionalisation in part by fostering bandwagoning behaviour by economic and political means.

3. The Idea of Regional Community in the Perspective of Constructivism

Constructivist approaches to regionalism in general focus on the development of a regional awareness that leads to the formation of a 'regional identity', or a shared feeling of 'we-ness', often is titled as 'cognitive regionalism'.¹⁴ According to this view regional cohesion relies on 'cognitive interdependence' rather than 'material interdependence'.¹⁵

Constructivist highlights the three stages in the development of security communities based on Adler and Barnett idea. This perspective emphasized on the stage where a security community has "shared identities, values, and meanings"¹⁶. It is a "socially constructed," "imagined," or

¹⁴ Hurrell (1995), p. 64

¹⁵ *ibid*

¹⁶ Adler and Barnett 1998, p.31

“cognitive” region, whose borders may or may not coincide with traditional geographical borders.¹⁷

The term “imagined community”¹⁸ raised by Anderson, means that even though members of a community can hardly meet most of the other members, they still retain the mental image of their communion. A more traditional example of an imagined community is a nation-state, whose size generally prevents citizens from knowing each other in person. For this type of community, common identities and values are essential because ties between members cannot be based on face-to-face interactions.

B. The Spectrum of ASEAN Community

1. ASEAN Political and Security Community

a. The Aims and Scope of ASEAN Political and Security Community

The purpose of ASEAN Political and Security Community is to ensure that countries in the region live at peace with one another and with the world in a just, democratic and harmonious environment.

The members of the community pledge to rely exclusively on peaceful processes in the settlement of intraregional differences and regard their security as fundamentally linked to one another and bound

¹⁷ A. Bellamy, *Security Communities and their Neighbours: Regional Fortresses or Global Integrators?*, (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p.67

¹⁸ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*

by geographic location, common vision and objectives. It has the following components:

- 1) political development;
- 2) shaping and sharing of norms;
- 3) conflict prevention;
- 4) conflict resolution;
- 5) post-conflict peace building; and
- 6) implementing mechanisms.¹⁹

The dimension in which the cooperation among ASEAN member states and external parties has moved forward significantly since the 1st ASEAN Summit in Bali in 1976, and prior to that, ASEAN political leaders had already been meeting to allow ASEAN to slowly and steadily mature. This early maturation culminated in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South East Asia and the Declaration of ASEAN Concord in Bali. ASEAN could then begin to be far more active as a regional organization. And it began two years later.

When Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1978, ASEAN members feared a domino effect and they crafted a response. Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, on behalf of ASEAN, decried the

¹⁹ ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Economic Community, retrieved from <http://www.asean.org/18741.htm> on 2nd March, 2011

invasion and called on the UN Security Council to do something to stop it. Unfortunately for ASEAN, a draft resolution to demand the immediate withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia was blocked by the USSR. Later, ASEAN wielded its regional power in the International Conference on Kampuchea.

The organization worked through the UN to enhance its regional and international position and demonstrate its relevance. This move was one of security, to prevent the spread of communism in the region and more immediately, to protect the borders of one of its members, Thailand. ASEAN proved itself an effective in “managing the external relations of the individual member states by determining common attitudes on key issues such as Indochina.”²⁰

Members see benefits with little cost, most importantly; they do not give up any sovereignty. ASEAN provides a network of support for its members. ASEAN members need not feel isolated, and therefore have not had to worry about some of the patron client relationships other countries lost their autonomy over during the Cold War.

The great powers were not competing in the ASEAN region. Thailand, for example, benefited from the other ASEAN members’

²⁰ Dilip Kumar, “Understanding ASEAN: Benefits and Risks,” *Asian Survey*, Vol. 22, No. 8.

support in recognizing its front line status in the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia during the conflict. Because of China's interest in South East Asia, China compromised with ASEAN on a UN settlement for Cambodia.

Bloc politics have enabled ASEAN states to "assert their position as subjects, rather than objects of international politics and as full participants in regional and global affairs.... It is an approach that is vital to a diverse group of states in a strategic and volatile region." One Foreign Minister of Singapore described one of the benefits of ASEAN cohesiveness as accommodating other member states' policies instead of pursuing "competitive interference." Such cooperation has made internal relations possible in such a motley group of nations with different economies and political cultures.

The creation of ASEAN was a significant achievement in diplomacy. It occurred at the end of the confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia and helped normalize relations between them. It has helped ease the disagreement between Malaysia and the Philippines over Sabah. ASEAN members' political and military leaders cooperate and share information regularly, and interaction among states has gradually increased over time. Thus, despite the great diversity of the region, ASEAN minimizes conflict and facilitates

cooperation in South East Asia. Four ground rules for cooperation that insure sovereignty is protected:

- 1) non-interference in the internal affairs of other members;
- 2) peaceful dispute resolution;
- 3) respect for each other's independence; and
- 4) respect for each other's territorial integrity.

These rules safeguard the supremacy of the state over the association by providing the good fences necessary to be good neighbors. For example, until UN action was taken, ASEAN maintained that the human rights abuses in East Timor were an internal affair of Indonesia and did not interfere. ASEAN members have found security in numbers in the face of external threats. But while they have followed their own rules, they have never proposed giving up their sovereignty to supranational institutions in the manner of the EU, and instead decide matters among states on a case by case basis. ASEAN Security Community is supported by existing bodies includes:

- 1) ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM)
- 2) ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM)
- 3) ASEAN Law Ministers' Meeting (ALAWMM)
- 4) ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC)

5) ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)

b. The Level of Political Integration

External economic relations present a different and equally revealing look at ASEAN's purpose through its international relations functions.

Table 2.1 Level of Political Integration

Type (Level)	Principal Features
Forum	governments in a region meet regularly, at least once a year
Secretariat	a small bureaucracy is set up in one of the participating country capitals, dealing with common information gathering and preparation of summit meetings
Regional Public Goods	countries pool resources together in offering certain region-wide services, such as tertiary education and training, and environmental functions including meteorology and sea surveillance
Common Passport or Free Movement	the citizens of the member states may be allowed to circulate freely without visa restrictions, crossing borders without controls
Representation	an assembly or parliament may be formed on a regional basis to broaden participation by including parliamentarians and political parties
Judicial Body	a court may be set up to offer adjudication of the regional set of rules agreed on by the member states
Policies Body	commissions or boards may be created in order to make regional policy on a continuous basis, such as a central bank engaging in monetary policy in a monetary union
Federation	a regional group of states may take the step to transform the regional group into a true political federation

ASEAN Economic Community Scorecard was developed based on similar initiatives such as the EU Internal Market Scorecard. ASEAN Economic Community Scorecard is aimed at identifying specific actions that must be undertaken by ASEAN collectively and its member States individually to establish ASEAN Economic Community by the year of 2015

b. The Level of Economic Integration

Economic integration does not appear suddenly. It takes series of process and development on each step as derived below:

Table 2.2 Level of Economic Integration

Type (Level)	Example	Membership	Principal features
Free Trade Area	North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)	United States Canada	No internal tariffs. Each country determines its own trade policies toward non-members.
	Closer Economic Relations (CER)	Mexico Australia New Zealand	
Customs Union	Andean Pact	Bolivia Colombia Ecuador Peru	As for FTA above. Common external tariff on goods imported from outside.
Common Market	European Community (EC) before January 1994. There has not been another.	12 European countries.	As for customs union above. Labour and capital free to move. No restrictions on migration.
Economic Union	European Union (EU) as from January 1999.	25 European countries.	As for common market above. Common currency - European

			Monetary Unit (called the 'Euro') Harmonisation of tax rates. Common monetary and fiscal policies.
Political Union	EU has some elements; see previous level. The ultimate aim is a United States of Europe.	25 European countries, but may include 28 countries by 2007.	European parliament, directly elected by citizens of EU countries. Council of Ministers: government ministers for each EU country. An administrative bureaucracy. Court of Justice: the official interpreter of EU law.

Source: Hill 2005, Chapter 8, pp. 267-270.

In almost similar fashion, Balassa²¹ made model of regionalisation, trade, investments and economic cooperation pulls the regional wagon towards deeper and deeper forms of integration. It covers five-stages integration as follow:

- 1) free trade area
- 2) customs union
- 3) economic community
- 4) monetary union
- 5) political federation

This model of regional cooperation is focused on economic benefits from wider regional integration. It targets the tangible

²¹ Bela Balassa, *Theory of Economic Integration* (Uppsala: Hæmavard, 1962), p. 204

economic rewards from increasing the size of the market, first from trade and later on from labour, capital and services. It wishes to capture the gains from having a single currency. Countries may choose between a free trade area and a customs union, depending on how much trade they already have with each other. They may proceed to the format of a community once they have achieved either a free trade area or a customs union.

Creating an economic community requires a lot of intergovernmental coordination, as entire new pieces of economic regulation must be introduced. It may also be necessary to create supranational bodies that arbitrate on the new rules. Thus, it is stage 3, the economic community, which is decisive for deep regional integration. The changes may be so extensive as to require constitutional revisions in the member states.

Putting a line, transnational ASEAN economic planning has not seen a great degree of success. In 1976, ASEAN created the ASEAN Industrial Projects Schemes (AIPS). AIPS were large scale projects, one to a country, that would respond to regional demand and ensure that resources were utilized optimally. Three of the five original AIPS failed. First, most members preferred to focus on national industrial development and export more to international markets rather than just ASEAN. Second, as ASEAN members were at a similar level

of development, they still produced the same tradable goods and their manufacturers were competitive rather than complementary. Third, the private sector was not interested in cooperating with the AIPS.²²

ASEAN Industrial Complementation Schemes (AICS) were projects in the 1980s to facilitate specialization in automotive components. Its first attempt, in 1981, was unsuccessful. AICS was replaced by the ASEAN Industrial Joint Ventures (AIJV) in 1983. AIJV's objectives were to encourage greater investment into and within South East Asia and to increase production by pooling resources and sharing markets. Most of these schemes failed as well, because goals and guidelines for negotiation were undefined, and because red tape slowed the process. The payoffs of all these ventures were not high enough because they implied only regional development, and members did not see high enough benefits from pursuing them.

To begin trade liberalization, ASEAN launched the Preferential Trading Arrangement (PTA) in 1977. However, since their economies were not complementary, ASEAN governments were reluctant to turn ASEAN into an FTA. They were keener on protecting domestic markets than opening their economies to their neighbors. Items that

²² Lay Hong Tan, "Will ASEAN Economic Integration Progress Beyond A Free Trade Area?", ICLQ, Vol. 3, 2004, pp. 937-938.

fell under the PTA were negotiated individually, and while tariffs were lowered on certain products, the most important ones went to the exclusion list. Even by the late 1980s, the PTA only covered 5% of ASEAN's total trade.

According to Tan, "ASEAN ideology has emphasized national resilience, accompanied by regional resilience." The PTA failed because sovereignty and self reliance were so important to newly independent countries, and economic policies reflected these feelings.²³

Following the Uruguay Round, ASEAN's economic integration widened and deepened. ASEAN members were afraid of falling behind in a world that was creating trading blocs. They wanted markets to attract FDI. Moreover, many of these governments were quasi democratic and their legitimacy required their delivering on promised high levels of growth. They hoped the AFTA would help them deliver.

One goal of the AFTA is intra ASEAN trade but it is a secondary goal. More important is increasing the competitiveness of individual member states internationally. Between 1993 and 1999, the value of intra ASEAN trade grew at a rate of 11.4% annually

²³ Tan, 2004, p.939.

(although in real terms it has remained constant as a percentage of the total trade of ASEAN members).

A major part of the AFTA was the Common Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme (CEPT). The successor to the PTA, the CEPT took a sectorial, rather than an item by item, approach. ASEAN leaders were afraid that the slowdown of miraculous East Asian economic growth and later the financial crisis would be damaging to their countries. They accelerated the creation of the CEPT to 2002 for the first six member states, and zero tariffs by 2008 for the rest.

However, to consider this a feat for free trade is somewhat misguided. Three lists of traded goods were exempt from the CEPT.

These are:

- 1) the temporary exclusion list (products for which the members are not yet ready to lower tariffs);
- 2) unprocessed ("sensitive" agricultural products); and
- 3) the general exception list (GEL- products permanently excluded for their qualities of national security, moral and health hazards and anything retaining artistic, historic or archaeological value).

Malaysia, protective of its automotive parts industry, has said that, due to the financial crisis, it will not cut tariffs on this sector until 2005. Laos and Vietnam's GELs contain categories that include

automobiles, petroleum, alcohol and tobacco. Though the GEL represents only 1.09% of all tariff lines in ASEAN, the vagueness of the wording of this clause (not to mention that of the previous two) enables member states to designate anything important to their national economy or sovereignty protected under this list. Full fledged free trade thus still seems a distant point on the horizon. ASEAN political leaders are tolerant of these abuses, likely because they all wish to retain some measure of protection over their own economies.

While ASEAN members talk not only of free trade but of a common market by 2020, to think of ASEAN as the next EU, with supranational authorities, is to think well ahead of any of the current heads of ASEAN. Unlike in the EU, national sovereignty and non-interference are sacrosanct. Moreover, treaties and declarations tend to be vaguely worded to afford members the opportunity to opt out of any of them in one way or another. Supranational authorities are not necessary because of established norms and consultative and consensus based decision making.

The progress of and changes to the organization are state led. In spite of the desire for pragmatic decisions and financial independence, Tan feels that it is urgent that ASEAN progress beyond an FTA in order to compete with China. ASEAN and China were on a par between 1989 and 1994 for inward FDI flows, but in 2001 China

received three times the FDI that ASEAN received, and this trend looks set to continue. Thus, for all its efforts, ASEAN's first few decades showed "lackluster performance" in pursuing economic integration and growth.²⁴ Instead, its achievements were largely political.

To strengthen the foundation, the idea of ASEAN Economic Community was introduced to the public for the first time at the 9th ASEAN Summit in October 2003 as recorded on the outcome which was named as Bali Concord II. The aims of ASEAN Economic Community cover the three keypoints to reach out by 2015. ASEAN Economic Community envisages the following key characteristics:

- 1) a single market and production base;
- 2) a highly competitive economic region;
- 3) a region of equitable economic development; and
- 4) a region fully integrated into the global economy.

The ASEAN Economic Community areas of cooperation include human resources development and capacity building; recognition of professional qualifications; closer consultation on macroeconomic and financial policies; trade financing measures; enhanced infrastructure and communications connectivity; development of electronic transactions through a ASEAN; integrating

industries across the region to promote regional sourcing; and enhancing private sector involvement for the building of the AEC ASEAN Economic Community. In short, the ASEAN Economic Community will transform ASEAN into a region with free movement of goods, services, investment, skilled labour, and freer flow of capital.²⁵

ASEAN Economic Community is supported by existing bodies includes:

- 1) ASEAN Economic Ministers (AEM)
- 2) ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) Council
- 3) ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) Council
- 4) ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Agriculture and Forestry (AMAF)
- 5) ASEAN Ministers on Energy Meeting (AMEM)
- 6) ASEAN Finance Ministers' Meeting (AFMM)
- 7) ASEAN Mekong Basin Development Cooperation (AMBDC)
- 8) ASEAN Ministers on Minerals (AMMin)
- 9) ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Science and Technology (AMMST)

²⁵ ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Economic Community, retrieved from

10) ASEAN Telecommunications and IT Ministers Meeting
(TELMIN)

11) ASEAN Tourism Ministers Meeting (M-ATM)

12) ASEAN Transport Ministers Meeting (ATM)

3. ASEAN Social and Cultural Community

ASEAN Social and Cultural Community is focused on nurturing the human, cultural and natural resources for sustained development in a harmonious and people-oriented ASEAN.

The ASEAN Social and Cultural Community aims to contribute to realize an ASEAN Community that is people-oriented and socially responsible with a view to achieving enduring solidarity and unity among the peoples and member states of ASEAN. It seeks to forge a common identity and build a caring and sharing society which is inclusive and where the well-being, livelihood, and welfare of the peoples are enhanced.²⁶

The process of constructing the idea has been laid on in 2003, when the ASEAN Leaders resolved that an ASEAN Community shall be established comprising three pillars, namely, ASEAN Security Community, ASEAN Economic Community and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. At the 12th ASEAN Summit on 13th January 2007 in Cebu, the Philippines the Leaders, affirming their strong commitment to accelerate the establishment of the

²⁶ ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Economic Community, retrieved from <http://www.asean.org/18770.htm> on 2nd March, 2011

ASEAN Community by 2015, signed the Cebu Declaration on the Acceleration of an ASEAN Community by 2015. The 13th ASEAN Summit held in Singapore on 20th November 2007, agreed to develop an ASCC Blueprint to ensure that concrete actions are undertaken to promote the establishment of an ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC).

There are eleven ASEAN sectoral ministerial meetings under the socio-cultural pillar responsible for regional efforts on:

- 1) rural development and poverty eradication;
- 2) social welfare;
- 3) labor;
- 4) education;
- 5) youth;
- 6) health;
- 7) disaster management;
- 8) haze;
- 9) environment;
- 10) information; and
- 11) culture and arts.

These ASEAN sectoral bodies carry out their respective work programmes and joint cooperation with a number of ASEAN Dialogue Partners, other international organizations, civil society organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector. Various forms of activities

include collaborative regional studies, research and technology development, capacity building programmes, sharing of information and best practices, formulation of regional frameworks, people-to-people exchange programmes, online database development, networking and partnerships and promotion of public awareness of regional developments and cooperation.

To synergise various sectoral efforts in the socio-cultural pillar of the ASEAN Community, the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Coordinating Conference (SOC-COM) has been established. The SOC-COM not only promotes better coordination and greater efficiency in ASEAN activities, but also instils a sense of community and a sense of being part of a higher goal beyond sectoral concerns. Autonomous bodies like the ASEAN Foundation, the ASEAN University Network, the ASEAN Business Advisory Council, and the Southeast Asia Ministers of Education Organization are also part of the SOC-COM.

ASEAN Social and Cultural Community is supported by existing bodies includes:

- 1) ASEAN Ministers Responsible for Culture and Arts (AMCA)
- 2) ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Disaster Management (AMMDM)
- 3) ASEAN Education Ministers Meeting (ASED)
- 4) ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on the Environment (AMME)
- 5) ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Haze (AMMH)

- 6) ASEAN Health Ministers Meeting (AHMM)
- 7) ASEAN Ministers Responsible for Information (AMRI)
- 8) ASEAN Labour Ministers Meeting (ALMM)
- 9) ASEAN Ministers Meeting on Rural
- 10) Development and Poverty Eradication (AMRDPE)
- 11) ASEAN Ministers Meeting on Social Welfare and Development
(AMMSWD)
- 12) ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Youth (AMMY)