

Political Dynasties and Political Recruitment: The Case of Golkar Party in South Sulawesi 2009-2013

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ABSTRACT

Political dynasty in practice is commonly featured by the candidature of the incumbent's wife, children or other relatives at a local or a legislative election. There are two main questions that will be discussed in this paper: why political dynasty continues to grow within the Golkar Party during the reform era? What causes political dynasty: is it due to party oligarchy or is it a logical consequence of democratic process in Indonesia? The research findings revealed that the recruitment process within the Golkar party in South Sulawesi we can infer that, first, the party has a standard in conducting political recruitment comprises of internal acceptability (PD2LT) and external acceptability (electability). However, in practice, the standard has not always been applied due to the interest and the need for the party to gain support from the public. Second, there are sufficient human resources within the party so that the party focuses on conducting recruitment among its cadres.

Keyword: Political dynasty, elite, political recruitment, oligarchy.

INTRODUCTION

There has been a growing acknowledgement that decentralization and democratization through elections and direct local elections have generated political kinship or political dynasty. The Minister of Internal Affairs states that there are at least 57 local leaders who have been establishing political dynasties at a local level.² It has been argued that political dynasties exist not only at the executive institution but also at the legislative, and thus strengthen the power of oligarchy among local elites.

Political dynasty in practice is commonly featured by the candidature of the incumbent's wife, children or other relatives at a local or a legislative election. Elite theory argues that the candidature of the incumbent's family or relatives has narrowed the elite circulation down only into the hand of a few powerful families. Consequently, it

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tends to deny the opportunity for other alternative candidates outside the family circle to join the contest. It further raises a concern on the democratic process at a local level, especially as it has been widely argued that local political elites play an important role to the development of a democratic system, in which a transition towards a consolidated democracy relies on a democratic rule abode by the actors (elites).

Political dynasty raises a problematic issue as it has been viewed as inconsistent with the spirit of democracy that underlines equal opportunity for all. Further, it is also believed that political dynasty hijacks democracy³. To eliminate the practice of political dynasty, the government has proposed a paragraph under the Regulation on the Election of Local Leaders that stated that the incumbents' families are prohibited to become a candidate at a local election. A person may become a candidate for a new governor, if she or he does not have any type of marital connections with the governor in power, but he/she may still join the candidacy if the connection can only be traced back with the past governor who is no longer in power for at least 1 period of term⁴. The same rules apply

for a candidate for a Regent or Mayor.

Political Dynasty is defined as the process of perpetuating power through an election that resulted in two or more members of the same family, tied by marital or family line, taking a political position at a national or local level. In Indonesia case, political dynasty occurs through a democratic process in both legislative and direct local election. Despite its limitation in a democratic system, political dynasty emerges as a result of people's choice. In the current context, political dynasty is not a result of a monarchical hereditary, but it takes place through an election, hence it is called "*dynastic democracy*". Thus it can be argued that political dynasty does not hijack democracy and in fact, it is part of the ongoing development of a democratic process.

Table 1 shows that political dynasty creates dynasties. From the table we can infer several points, *firstly*, the incumbents have a strong will to prolong their power by creating political dynasties at a local level. It is important to point out the fact that in Indonesia case, political dynasty emerges widely during the reform era. *Secondly*, in South Sulawesi case, the political dynasties are more prominent within the Golkar Party. Thirdly, the political dynasty phenomenon occurs in both provincial and regency level. *Fourth*, political dynasty in South Sulawesi comes from several political

2 *Kompas Daily*, 1 April 2013.

3 As stated by Siti Zuhro, in *Kompas Daily*, 22 February 2013

4 *Kompas Daily*, 16 November 2012.

families. *Fifth*; there is a trend in South Sulawesi that a family member of a political dynasty is also a party official. When discussing about the problem of political dynasty in Indonesia, we cannot separate it from the general functions of a political party. In this regard, the most important function that should be taken into account is a political recruitment as a gateway to a political position. Political recruitment is defined as a political process conducted by a

political party to appoint particular individuals in a political position. Political recruitment consists of two steps of competition, namely internal competition to select a party candidate and inter-parties competition to win the election. In selecting a candidate, a political party sets particular requirements in line with the party's policy, ranging from popularity, electability, track records, political career, to loyalty to the party.

Table 1.: Political Dynasty in South Sulawesi

Name of Family	Name/Familial Connection	Position	Political Party	Position at the Party
Muhammad Yasin Limpo*	1. Syahrul Yasin Limpo/son of Yasin Limpo	-Governor Sulawesi Selatan (2008-1013 dan 2013-2018). -Deputy Governor (2003-2008) -Regent of Gowa (1994-2002)	PDK, PAN, PDIP	Chairman of DPD Golkar Sulsel (2009-2014)
	2. Sitti Nurhayati/ wife of M Yasin Limpo	-Member of Regional Parliament (DPRD) South Sulawesi (1987-1992, 1992-1997, 1997-1999) -Member of Indonesia Parliament/DPR RI (2004-2009)	Golkar	
	3. Tenri Olle/ daughter of Yasin Limpo/older sister of the Governor	-Member of Regional Parliament (DPRD Gowa) (2004-2009) -Member of Regional Parliament (DPRD Sulawesi Selatan) (2009-2014)	Golkar	Chairman of DPD Golkar Gowa
	4. Ichsan Yasin Limpo/son of M Yasin Limpo/younger brother of the Governor	-Member of Regional Parliament Assembly (DPRD Sulawesi Selatan) (1999-2004) -Regent of Gowa (2005-2010 and 2010-2015)	Golkar	Treasury of Golkar party-Sulawesi Selatan (2009-2015)
	5. Haris Yasin Limpo/son of M Yasin Limpo/younger brother of the Governor	Member of Regional Parliament assembly (DPRD) Makassar (2004-2009 and 2009-2014)	Golkar	Chairman of Golkar in Makassar
	6. Dewi Yasin Limpo/daughter of M. Yasin Limpo	Former legislative candidate at the Indonesian Parliament/DPR RI 2009	Hanura	Chairman of Hanura - South Sulawesi
	7. Indra Thita Chandra/daughter of Syahrul Yasin Limpo	Member of Indonesia Parliament/DPR RI (2009-2014)	PAN	Deputy Secretary General PAN 2010-2015
	8. Adnan Purichta/son of Ichsan Yasin Limpo	Member of Regional Parliament - Sulawesi Selatan (2009-2014)	Democratic Party	

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Qahhar Muzzakar**	1. Aziz Qahhar Muzzakar/son of Qahhar Muzzakar	Member of Indonesia's Parliament/DPR RI (2004-2009 and 2009-1014)		
	2. Buhari Qahhar Muzzakar/younger brother of Aziz Muzzakar	Member of Regional Parliament - Sulawesi Selatan (2004-2009 and 2009-2014)	PAN	Secretary of PAN Sulsel
	3. Andi Muzzakar/younger brother of Aziz Muzzakar	Regent of Luwu (2008-2013)	Golkar	Chairman DPD Golkar Luwu
Arief Sirajuddin***	1. Ilham Arief Sirajuddin/son of Arief Sirajuddin	- Member of Regional Parliament- Sulawesi Selatan (1999-2004) - Regent of Makassar (2004-2009 and 2009-2014)	Demokratic Party	Chairman of Democratic Parry - Sulawesi Selatan
	2. Andi Rahmatika Dewi/Niece of Ilham Arief Sirajuddin	Member of Regional Parliament of Makassar (2009-2014)	Golkar	Deputy Secretary of Golkar- Makassar
Andi Idris Galigo	1. Andi Idris Galigo	Regent of Bone (2003-2008 and 2008-2013)	Golkar	Chairman of Golkar in Bone, but later resign from the party due to local election conflict in 2012
	2. Muh. Irsan Idris Galigo/son of Idris Galigo	Member of Regional Parliament - Sulawesi Selatan (2009-2014)	Golkar	Head of Soksri Bone, later at the 2014 election became a candidate representing National Democratic Party.
Amin Syam	1. Amin Syam	Governor of Sulawesi Selatan (2003 - 2008)	Golkar	Former Chairman of Golkar- Sulawesi Selatan
	2. Imran Tenri Tatta/son of Amin Syam	Member of Regional Parliament of Makassar (2009-2014)	Golkar	Deputy Secretary of Golkar - Kota Makassar
Ibrahim Rewa	1. Ibrahim Rewa	Chairman of Regional Parliament (DPRD) Takalar (1999-2002) Regent of Takalar (2002 - 2007 and 2007-2012)	Golkar	Former Chairman of Golkar - Kabupaten Takalar
	2. Natsir Ibrahim/son of Ibrahim Rewa	Member of Regional Parliament (DPRD) Takalar (2009 -2012) Wakil Bupati Takalar (2012-2017)	Golkar	Chairman of Golkar - Kabupaten Takalar

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Padjalangi	1. Andi Padjalangi	Yaqin	Member of Regional Parliament of Makassar (2004 – 2009 and 2009 – 2104)	Golkar	Chairman of DPD I Golkar - Sulawesi Selatan
	2. Andi Padjalangi/younger brother of Yaqin Padjalangi	Fashar	Deputy Regent of Bone (2003-2008) Regent of Bone (2013 -2018)	Golkar	
	3. Andi Rio Idris Padjalangi/younger brother of Yaqin Padjalangi		Member of Indonesia's parliament (DPR RI) (2009 – 2014)	Golkar	Deputy of Treasury of Golkar- Sulawesi Selatan
Nurdin Halid	1. Nurdin Halid		Former member of Indonesia's Parliament (DPR RI)	Golkar	
	2. A. Kadir Halid/younger brother of Nurdin Halid		Member of Regional Parliament (DPRD) Sulawesi Selatan (1999 – 2004 dan 2009 – 2013)	Golkar	Deputy Chairman of Golkar Sulawesi Selatan

Source: from various media sources

* Muhammad Yasin Limpo is a former Regent of Gowa, Maros and Takalar

** Qahhar Muzzakkar was a prominent figure in DI/TII

*** Col (Ret) H.M. Arief Sirajuddin is a former Regent of Gowa

Based on the above discussion, there are two main questions that will be discussed in this paper: why political dynasty continues to grow within the Golkar Party during the reform era? What causes political dynasty; is it due to party oligarchy or is it a logical consequence of democratic process in Indonesia?

Theoretical Frameworks

Political Parties exercises various approaches in political recruitment process. Some experts differentiate the types of political recruitment based on several categories.

Almond and Powell⁵ categorize the recruitment into two types, namely the close recruitment among close group of people who have special connection, such as through friendship, same faith/religion, ethnicity and family line; and the open mechanism whereby all citizens who meet the requirement may join the recruitment.

Based on the characteristics of the candidates, Barbara Geddes⁶

5 Gabriel Almond and E Bingham Powell, *Comparative Politics: A Development Approach*, Feffer&Simons Privated, Bombay, 1966, hal. 79.

6 Barbara Geddes, *Politicians Dilema: Building State Capacity in Latin America*,

introduces 4 recruitment models: first; *partisanship* or political recruitment based on the loyalty of members to the party. This model tends to ignore factors of competency and skill. Second, *meritocratic*, a political recruitment based on high competency among entrepreneurs, technocrats and experts. Third; *compartmentalization* whereby pragmatic consideration is used and it could be based on meritocracy or other factors that may affect the number of supports and the loyalty towards the party. Fourth; *survival* model which is based on principles of remuneration, human resources and patronage values.

Reuven Hazan⁷ categorizes recruitment process into 5 types which can be divided between the two continuums of inclusivity and exclusivity. The first type is a selection conducted by the voters; the second one is a selection conducted by members of the party; third is the one that is conducted by the delegation of the party; fourth is a selection by the party elites and five, a selection by Party's chairman.

University of California Press, 1996, hal. 78-79.

7 Reuven Y. Hazan dan Gideon Rahat, *Democracy Within Parties, Candidate Selection Methods and their Political Consequences*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2010., hal. 34

Social, technical and cultural aspects are also crucial in the selection process in a political party. Selected candidates are not merely a result of an inclusive selection process. Their selection is also influenced by the cultural factors of the voters. In a traditional society, for example, there is a tendency where voters will likely to vote for popular candidates than a candidate who deem more competent.

Inclusivity is important in the selection and recruitment process. Nevertheless, it does not necessarily equal to democratic process. In this line, it should also be noted that exclusive process of recruitment does not always signify an authoritarian process. However, it is widely accepted that on a normative note, the more inclusive the process; the more democratic it is. Further, a selection or recruitment process is also a manifestation of an internal party democratic process. An internal competition within a party could push democratization within the party which will further encourage balance of power among personal factions, ideological groups, generations and other groups in the party⁸.

The problem with the selection and

8 Reuven Y Hazan dan Gideon Rahat, *Ibid.*, p. 10.

recruitment arises as the processes are viewed as an 'internal business' within the party, thus it is relatively unknown to the public. As argued by Duverger⁹, a candidate selection is a secret and private process. Howard, analysing the case of selection in the UK, uses the term "the secret garden". The public are unaware of the criteria and the people who decide the selection due to its secretiveness.

The other factor affecting the selection is the origins of the party. In Indonesia, all political parties are initially created by the elites, hence they do not emerge from the grass roots level. It is after their creation that the parties started to appoint and elect parties' officials nationally and locally at the grassroots level. As a result, political parties are likely to be elitist. The elites hold a dominant role in the decision and policy making process. This mechanism will eventually weaken the political party.

"If the party does not function as a filtering mechanism, then the key actors in the process may become the candidates themselves, who will mobilize supporters directly. The whole selection process could then be driven by the candidates and not by the parties. This could lead to the weakening

of partisan discipline and cohesiveness, which will further lead to a declining ability of the parties to stabilize the political process and to operate effectively in the parliamentary arena"¹⁰

However, elitism, as argued by Robert Michels¹¹, is a common phenomenon in a bureaucracy as a manifestation of party's oligarchy. Oligarchy is defined as a form of government where the political power lies on a small group of minorities¹². Michels argues that the iron law of oligarchy is inherent in all organizations. It can be said that an organization is an oligarchy, because an organization breeds the dominance of the elected over the voters, the mandate giver over the receiver. According to Michels, the iron law of oligarchy emerges due to

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p 9.

¹¹ Robert Michels, *Partai Politik, Kecenderungan Oligarkis dalam Birokrasi*, Rajawali, Jakarta, 1984. Jeffrey Winters in his book "Oligarchy" criticises the concept of oligarchy introduced by Michels. Winters argue that Michels mixes up the two different concepts of oligarchy and the elite. He further argues that Oligarchy includes efforts to maintain material wealth and income.

¹² *The International Encyclopedia of The Social Sciences*, as quoted by Jeffrey A. Winters, *Oligarchy*, Cambridge University Press, London, 2011, p. 1.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 7

the low capacity, lack of experiences, lack of education, the apathy and sense of inferiority of the political masses¹³.

The oligarchical mechanism in the party shows that the party's system does not run properly. Pragmatical relations between the party and its constituents contribute to this condition. Constituents are seen as a tool and political vehicle to legitimize the parties' elites. Accordingly, political parties' presence in the society is limited to periods before the elections when they need the votes to help them obtain a legitimate power.

Institutionalization also plays an important part in recruitment and selection process. Huntington defines institutionalization as a process whereby the organization's rules and procedures are becoming more standardized and stable¹⁴. In other words, institutionalization includes a process of stabilization of a political party that manifested in its attitude and culture¹⁵.

Huntington further argues that institutionalization is closely related to the political organization's ability to adapt with its environment. This ability to adapt is measured by how old the party is, how often the change of leadership occurs, leadership factor, and the number of party's functional and organizational changes. Susan Scarrow¹⁶, using a more simple definition, states that institutionalization basically is a compatibility between system, process, procedures and the action. Putting the institutionalization in the recruitment context, it is defined as a consistency between political recruitment process with the system, process and procedures determined by the party's policy.

Institutionalization, according to Panebianco, is viewed based on the degree of its 'systemness', which includes differentiation and coherence, or using Panebianco's term, it is called factionalization and ability to control human resources in performing party's functions. In addition to the two factors, Panebianco also views that autonomy plays an important role

¹³ David Held, *Models of Democracy*, Akbar Tanjung Institute, Jakarta, 2006, hal 156.

¹⁴ Samuel P. Huntington, *Terrib Politik Pada Masyarakat Yang Sedang Berubah*, Rajawali Press, Jakarta, 2004, p. 16.

¹⁵ Ramlan Surbakti, *Perkembangan Partai Politik Indonesia*, in Andy Ramses M and La Bakry (editor), *Politik dan Pemerintahan Indonesia*, MIPPI, Jakarta,

2009, p. 143.

¹⁶ Susan Scarrow, *Political Parties and Democracy in the Theoretical and Practical Perspectives, Implementing Intra-Party Democracy*, National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 2005.

in institutionalization. Janda, takes a different view from Panebianco, sees party's institutionalization from the perspective of *reification*, of the party image in the society.

Based on various approaches in defining institutionalization, Vicky Randall and Lars Svasand¹⁷ simplify it and categorize it into internal-external and structural-cultural aspects which include 1) the degree of 'systemness', 2) the degree of value identity 3) the degree of autonomy, and 4) the degree of public image.

Institutionalization may affect organization differently. Selznick argues that there is a difference between an institutionalized organization and un-institutionalized organization. In un-institutionalized organization, its members tend to focus on increasing their objectives, whereas in an institutionalized organization, there is a sense of care and commitment to keep the organization alive¹⁸.

In some parties, personal based

leadership are relatively play a dominant role. The dominance of personal based leadership within the party organization is mainly due to the weakness of party's grassroots¹⁹, consequently, a party will likely use popular figures to gain the support of the voters. The dominance will further affect the party's image among the people as it causes the lack of knowledge about the party. The public will recognize and know the popular figure more than the party's platform itself. In the context of political dynasty, as stated by O'Dwyer, party's weakness in its institutionalization process will encourage political patronage.

DISCUSSION

The discussion about the political dynasty and political recruitment inside Golkar Party in South Sulawesi will be divided into several chapters, which include social and cultural context of the community in South Sulawesi, the history of political dynasty in South Sulawesi and the political recruitment inside the Golkar Party in South Sulawesi.

¹⁷ Vicky Randall dan Lars Svasand, in *Party Politics Journal*, Vol. 8 January No. 1 tahun 2002, as quoted by Ramlan Surbakti, in Andy Ramses and La Bakry, *Op.Cit.*, hal. 143

¹⁸ Selznick, seperti dikutip dalam Steven Levitsky, "Institutionalization and Peronism. The Concept, The Case, and The Case for Unpacking the Concept", in *Party Politics*, Vol. 4, No. 1, Sage Publication, 1998.

¹⁹ Dalam kondisi ini, partai-cenderung menggunakan patronase politik untuk memperoleh dukungan massa. Lihat dalam Connor O'Dwyer, *Runaway State Building, Patronage Politics and Democratic Development*, The John Hopkin University Press, Baltimore, 2006, hal 6.

Social and cultural context of the people in South Sulawesi

South Sulawesi population in 2012 is approximately at 8,190,222 people who live in 24 regencies/cities. The composition of the population consists of 4,003,455 male (48.84%) and female 4,186,567 (51.16%)²⁰. Around 1,369,606 of the population live in Makassar.

South Sulawesi is a multicultural region consists of various ethnic identities. The largest ones are Bugis (41.9 %), Makassar (25.43 %), Toraja (9.02 %) and Mandar (6.10 %) and the other 17.55 % includes ethnicities such as Luwu, Duri, Selayar, Javanese, Maduranese, Minangkabau, Sundanese, Banten and Banjar. Each ethnicities speaks different language. The Mandars and Torajans live in the northern part of South Sulawesi; the Bugis live in Central and Southeast South Sulawesi; and the Makassars live in the Southern part of South Sulawesi. The Bugis mostly reside in Kabupaten Pangkep, Bulukumba, Barru, Sinjai, Bone, Wajo, Parepare, Sidrap, Pinrang, Enrekang, Luwu, Kota Palopo, Luwu Utara and Luwu Timur. The Makassars live in Makassar, Gowa, Takalar, sebagian Maros, Pangkep, Jeneponto, Bantaeng, in parts of Bulukumba

and Selayar. The Mandars mostly live in Tana Toraja and Toraja Utara. The Torajans reside in Parepare, Enrekang and Pinrang²¹.

Table 2.: The ethnic Composition in South Sulawesi²²

Ethnicities	Number	Percentage (%)
Bugis	3.266.440	41,90
Makassar	1.982.187	25,43
Toraja	702.951	9,02
Mandar	475.505	6,10
Lainnya	596.369	17,55
Total	7.794.923	100

Source: Various Sources

There is a strong bond of ethnic identities in South Sulawesi. The Bugis, for example, are united under an ethnic brotherhood and friendship that they call 'saudara sesama Bugis (brotherhood among the Bugis)'- (*sempugri*)²³. There is also a strong and a complex cultural identity which can be distinguished

21 Kompas, 19 Agustus 2012.

22 Taken from Eriyanto, Faktor Etnis dalam Pilkada, *Lingkaran Survei Indonesia*, Ed. 09, 2008, p. 13, and Kompas, 19 January 2010.

23 Mattulada, as quoted by Ahmad Ubbe, *Perbuatan Malewang (Keusilaan Siri) menurut Hukum Adat: Studi tentang Pandangan Pengadilan dan Masyarakat Bugis Sulawesi Selatan*, a Dissertation, Faculty of Law, Universitas Indonesia, 2007.

20 *Ibid.*

by the local identity (village, sub-regency, regency), sub-ethnics identity (i.e. Makasar from Selayar region, Makasar from Gowa region, Bugis from Bone, Bugis from Luwu), ethnic group identities (Bugis, Makassar, Mandar, Toraja), island identity (Sulawesi), regional identity (Eastern part of Indonesia) and national identity (Indonesia).²⁴

The competition among different ethnicities, especially between Bugis and Makassar, can easily be captured in the dynamic of local politics and the competition between different candidates, including those supported by a well connected political dynasty. The political dynasty from the Bugis is likely to gain support from the same ethnic identities. On the other hand, a candidate from the Makassars will be supported by the same clans as well.

The History of Political Dynasty in South Sulawesi

Historically, political dynasty was unknown in South Sulawesi. The government system was known to be democratic. There was no

monarchical hereditary in the Kingdom in the region. They used 'parliament like' structure which was called *bate salapang* in Gowa, *Arung PattapulloE* in Wajo, and *Adé Pitue* in Bone to elect their leaders. However, the family of the king did have a better chance to be elected as a leader. The 'parliament' was more likely to elect a king's family members and other members of the noble family.

The Kingdom of Gowa was led by a king who was called *Sampoja ri Gowa*, a descendent of *Tomanurung*. The Kingdom was consisted of 9 regions (lower states) that were led by *Karaeng* or *Gallarang*. These 9 region were united under one Kingdom council called *Bate Salapang ri Gowa*. *Bate Salapang* (consisted of 8 regions: Tombolo, Lakiung, Parang-Parang, Data, Agangiene, Saumata, Bissei, Sero dan Kalili) was known as the Parliament with its main duty to set up the regulation in the kingdom. *Bate Salapang* has the main duty to elect the king of Gowa from several candidates among the descendents of the King and from other King's family who met the requirement.

In the Kingdom of Wajo, the concept of *tomanurung* was unknown. The Government body of Tana Wajo was called *Arung PattapulloE* (seignoral forty); consisted of a King (*Arung Matoa*); 6 *Arung Ennenge* or *Petta*

24 R. Anderson Sutton, *Reforming Arts and Cultural Politics in South Sulawesi*, KITLV, Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies, BKI 151-IV (1995), accessed from <http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp>, 28 December 2011.

Enmenge (the council of seignoral six) with main responsibilities to handle the security and war and also to assist *Arung Matoa*; 30 *Arung Mabbicara*, a parliament like in Tana Wajo with main responsibilities to create and legalize the Law; and 3 *Suro ri Bateng*, a Tana Wajo's ambassadors who helped connect the King and the people. The system in Arung Matoa Wajo was different to those in Bone and Gowa, in which the Arung Wajo was not passed on from one family to the other, but they were elected by the 39 members of *Puang ri Wajo* from both inside and outside their clan who were deemed qualified.

Mattulada called the changes of leadership in the Kingdom of Bone as "The Leadership of a Traditional Family", which leader was elected based on a rationality. The Kingdom of Bone consisted of 7 states and led by a *Matoa*, which was later called *Matoa PituE* which then was transformed into *Ade PituE* (The Government Council). The power of the Kingdom of Bone was centered at the King who was called *Arung Mangkau'* (the sovereign King). In practice, the king was assisted by *pampawa ade'* with main responsibility to manage daily works.

The positions were passed on from an individual elected

within the clan of *abbatireng* (=family) of the past leaders. In this case the children of a particular leader will not necessarily become the next or another leader just by inheriting the position from their father. For a position, there are always several available candidates from the clan group of *abbatireng* or those who have experienced a particular position in the past²⁵.

The power of *pampawa ade'* depends on the power of the king. The stronger the King, the better the *pampawa ade'*'s contribution in assisting the King, which then turn into a monarchical system. However, if the king is weak, it will lead to oligarchy and or aristocracy²⁶.

Historically, the Kings of Gowa, Bone and Wajo did not inherit their position from their parents. They were elected through a 'local election'. However, the election was also conducted among the Kings family, in which the Kings groomed their own candidates. This applied in all Kingdoms, except in Wajo, where a candidate from outside the King family were allowed to be elected.

The government system during

25 Mattulada, Latoa, *Suatu Lukisan Analitis terhadap Antropologi Politik Orang Bugis*, Gadjah Mada University Press, Yogyakarta, 1985, p 412-413

26 *Ibid.*, p. 412.

Table 3. Noble Family Descendent as Regents

No.	Region	Name of Regent/Deputy Regent
1.	Soppeng	A. Sutomo/A. Sarimin
2.	Barru	A. M Rum/Kamrir Mallongi
3.	Pangkep	Syahrudin Noor/A. Bau Kemal
4.	Maros	A. Jamaluddin/A. Paharuddin
5.	Bantaeng	Nurdin Abdullah Kr. Nurdin/Asli Mustajab Kr. Lili
6.	Jenepono	Radjamilo/ Burhanuddin BT
7.	Wajo	A. Burhanuddin Unru-Amran Mahmud
8.	Sinjai	A. Rudiyanto Asapa/A. Massalinri Litief
9.	Bone	A. M. Idris Galigo/Said Pabokori
10	Pinrang	H. A. Aslam Patonangi

Source: various

the Kingdom era affects the practice of government in the post Kingdom period. During the Dutch Colonialism, the Kings were elected as *regents* who were responsible for the governance in their respectation regency. The members of the noble family and technocrats who hold a title's name such as *andi*, *karaeng* and *daeng* were also played their part in the bureaucracy. As a result, although there were changes in the leadership of the local government, the replacements came from the noble family.

Andi Faisal Bakti in his research in Wajo found that the family of the king still plays their role in the current political and government system.

A research by Andi Faisal Bakti in Sengkang Regent Sulawesi Selatan. on

Kekuasaan Keluarga di Wajo, Sulawesi Selatan (2007)/The Power of Family in Wajo, South Sulawesi (2007), found that the changes within the political system in Sengkang Community, do not change the structure of power in the region. The Kings and their families passed on their power to their descendents during the old order, the new order and in reform era. Despite the fact that the system has changed, the power are still centered around the elite and the King's family. The research showed that most of the sub-regents, regents, and chairmen of the parliaments come from the King's family and they adhere to the power structure based on kinship²⁷.

The phenomenon of power that lies among the elite and noble family

²⁷ *Sinar Harapan*, Di bawah Kuasa Orde Baru, 13 May 2009.

can also be found in other regions. Mohtar Haboddin's research²⁸ showed that during the local leader's election in 2009-2013 at the Regency/City in South Sulawesi, there were 9 regions that were led by leaders from a noble family. In those 9 regions, among 74 candidates for local leader and deputy local leader, 30 of them come from noble families. Currently, there are at least 10 regencies led by regents who hold a title such as Andi or Karaeng.

In several regions, there is a growing trend for the incumbent to perpetuate and prolong their power by appointing their family and relatives to become a candidate as shown in the following table:

Table 4. *Incumbent's Family in local election in South Sulawesi*

Regency/ City	Incumbent	Party	The Candidate from the Incumbent's family	Supporting Party	Note
Bone	A.M. Idris Galigo	Golkar	M. Irsan Idris Galigo	<i>Independent</i>	Irsan lost against Andi Fahsar Padjalangi (the cousin of Idris Galigo), supported by Golkar
Takalar	Ibrahim Rewa	Golkar	Natsir Ibrahim (Deputy Regent)	Golkar	Won the election
Jeneponto	Radjamilo	Golkar	A Fachsirie Radjamilo	Golkar	Lose to Ihsan Iskandar (Democratic Party)
Pare-Pare	Zaen Katoe	Golkar	Herman Katoe	Hanura, PPP, PKPI and PBB	Lose to HM Taufan Pawe-H A Faisal Andi Sapada, supported by Golkar

28 Muhtar Haboddin, 'Kemenangan Karaeng dalam Pilkada', in *Jurnal Aliansi*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2012

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Sinjai	Rudiyanto Asapa	Golkar	Andi Seto Gadhispa Asapa	Gerindra, PPRN and PAN. Golkar's candidates are Andi Mahyanto-A Massalinri (Deputy regent/ incumbent)	Sabirin Yahya-Fajar Yanwar (Democratic Party) won the election. Andi Jefriyanto Asapa (the relative of Rudiyanto Asapa) was also a candidate in the election.
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From various sources

From the historical perspective as discussed above, political dynasty is not an exclusive phenomenon during the reform era, as it can be traced back from the past era. The local culture in South Sulawesi that we know today is a legacy of the Kingdoms of Bone, Gowa, Soppeng and Wajo. Noble families holding a particular title such as "Andi" for the Bugis and "Karaeng/Daeng" for the Makassar are still dominant in politics and government positions. It is obvious that the Bugis and Makassar are two most dominant and influential ethnics in politics and the government in South Sulawesi. In addition to the two ethnicities, the Mandar and Toraja are also influential. Members of the noble families act as a patron who always maintains their relationship

with their clientele²⁹. The strength of political dynasty in South Sulawesi is inseparable with the type of such patronage relations which in Bugis language is known as *pongawa-sawi* relationship³⁰. According to Pelras there are at least three main factors

29 As quoted by Tri Ratnawati, "Demokrasi di Tengah Masyarakat Feodalistik, Kasus Kota Makassar dan Kabupaten Bone", in Syamsudin Haris (Editor), *Pemilu Langsung di Tengah Oligarki Partai, Proses Nominasi dan Seleksi Calon Legislatif Pemilu 2004*, Gramedia, Jakarta, 2005, p. 246.

30 R Siti Zuhro, dkk: *Demokrasi Lokal, Perubahan dan Kesinambungan Nilai-Nilai Budaya Politik Lokal di Jawa Timur, Sumatera Barat, Sulawesi Selatan dan Bali*. Penerbit Ombak, Yogyakarta, 2009, p. 184. Patron-Client Relations in Sulawesi Selatan has also been discussed by Heddy Shri Ahimsa Putra, *Patron dan Klien di Sulawesi Selatan, Sebuah Kajian Fungsional-Struktural*, Kepel Press, Yogyakarta, 2007.

on which the patron-client relations are based on.

...(1) the bilateral kinship system; (2) a social stratification that encourage the member of noble families to actively engage in trade and in the distribution of wealth to their clients; (3) a hierarchical relations between members of smaller kingdom and the elites in a larger kingdom under a confederate system in which the local elites elite need as much as support in order to become member of the confederation³¹.

The bilateral kinship system³² as a relational system, which is based on both paternal and maternal line, arguably helps strengthening the family kinship and patronage in South Sulawesi. Some people take advantage of the kinship system to raise their social status by marrying member of a noble family.

There are several prominent political dynasties in South Sulawesi, namely the families of Muhammad

Yasin Limpo, Qahhar Muzakar, Ilham Arief Sirajuddin, Andi Idris Galigo, Amin Syam, Ibrahim Rewa, Padjalangi, and Nurdin Halid. Among those families, Muhammad Yasin Limpo is arguably the most influential one whose members of the family are more dominant in several political positions as compared to others.

Form the table 4 we can infer that while the incumbent's relatives or families do not necessarily win the election, the elected candidates are most likely to have relations with the past leader. Their successful candidacies are mostly benefited from the people's conviction that it is important to them to elect leaders from a family with past leadership experience.

Political Recruitment Inside the Golkar Party

Table 1 shows that political dynasty in both political position and political party officials are more prominent in the Golkar party. Golkar party is known as a strong and established political party with long political experience. Its financial capacity, human resources within the organization of the party and the party's membership are the sources of the Golkar's strength³³.

31 As quoted by R. Siti Zuhro, et al; *ibid.*, p. 185.

32 Sistem kekerabatan ini dalam bahasa Inggris disebut dengan *cognatic*, merupakan sistem kekerabatan yang tidak hanya bersifat patrilineal ataupun matrilineal, namun gabungan dari keduanya, seperti juga yang terjadi dalam masyarakat Eropa. Lihat dalam Christian Pelras, *Manusia Bugis*, Penerbit Nalar bekerjasama dengan Forum Jakarta-Paris, Jakarta, 2006, hal. 176.

33 Peter M. Siavelis dan Scott Morgenstern,

During the New Order period, Golkar was a hegemonic party with its cadres strongly sitting in the bureaucracy and military. During the reform era, Golkar lost those two strongest supporters. To adapt to the new political situation and the changes, Golkar develops a new paradigm by exercising its functions consistently to build itself as an inclusive, independent, democratic, moderate, solid, well rooted and responsive towards the problems faced by the community, the nation and the country³⁴.

Golkar declares itself as a reformist and democratic party, among other by highlighting its inclusiveness and its commitment to eliminate collusion, corruption and nepotism. Akbar Tanjung states that:

....Golkar has been developing a *merit system* based on a principle of achievement that are free of primitive values of collusion, corruption and nepotism, to encourage its members and cadres to continuously improve themselves³⁵.

It is interesting to discuss the phenomenon within the Golkar party, especially the fact that shows how political dynasty blooms within the party while on the other hand it is also committed to develop merit system that is free of collusion, corruption and nepotism. As has been mentioned before, political dynasty emerges as part of political patronage, which according to O'Dwyer, occurs due to the weakening of institutionalization of political party³⁶. The analysis of political dynasty in this paper aims to test O'Dwyer's thesis³⁷ that political dynasty is a choice taken by the party when the support from the people is low, which force the party to depend much on its active members and its popular leaders to gain the support.

As an established party, Golkar has a large number of cadres all around the country. In doing their political recruitment, albeit committed to have the recruitment openly, in

Pathways To Power, Political Recruitment and Candidate Selection in Latin America, The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2008, hal. 12 – 17.

34 Akbar Tanjung, *The Golkar Way, Survival Partai Golkar di Tengah Turbulensi Politik Era Transisi*, Gramedia, Jakarta, 2007, hal. 98.

35 *Ibid*, p. 99.

36 Conor O'Dwyer, *Runaway State Building, Patronage Politics and Democratic Development*, The John Hopkin University Press, Baltimore, 2006, p. 25.

37 Thesis O'Dwyer did not specify mention about political dynasty, instead he discussed about political patronage. O'Dwyer argues that political patronage occurs when there was no development of political bureaucracy as a prerequisite of the establishment of a party. As See Conor O'Dwyer, *Op.Cit.*

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reality, because they have a large number of cadres, the recruitment is conducted internally among the existing cadres. Cadres are those who have applied to become a member and actively involve in Party's activities and programs. Golkar membership is divided into two types; an active and non-active. A legislative candidate of the party is elected among the active members.

Golkar sets up several criteria to become a cadre; namely the ability and capability to solve problems; tenacious, ability to take initiative, militant, discipline and having a competence related to ideology, politics, the Golkar's values, leadership and professionalism³⁸.

The selection process of the Golkar party's candidate consists of 3 phases, namely screening of the candidate, filtering, and decision process. A screening is a phase which includes an identification process of the suitable candidate within the Golkar Party. Filtering is a selection process and decision making process is the final step of the election of the candidate who will later on be submitted to the KPUD.

In its political recruitment to select

a legislative candidate, Golkar introduces the instrument of PD2LT (prestasi/achievement, dedikasi/dedication, disiplin/discipline, loyalitas/loyalty and tidak tercela/clean records). The PD2LT is the main requirement to gain internal acceptability, that include a selection process based on achievement, contribution to the party and the track record with regard to the party's programs.

The PD2LT will be the determining factor to judge whether particular member is qualified to become a legislative candidate. In addition to the PD2LT, local representation will also come into play. Further, as stated in the Party's bylaws, leadership and independency are also crucial in the selection.

In the party, there are 7 members of the selection team consisting of chairman, deputy chairman, secretary, head of OKK (Organisasi Kader dan Keanggotaan/Cadre Organization and Membership), Secretary of OKK, head of elections winning committee and secretary of elections winning committee. The team decided who would become the legislative candidate. In determining the sequence number of the candidates, the party uses party's organizational structure. The candidate with a higher rank and position at the party will likely be

³⁸ A result of a national working meeting of Partai Golkar 2010, Suara Golkar Suara Rakyat, Sekretaris Jenderal DPP Partai Golkar, 2010, p. 87-88.

on the top of the list.

The structural position will determine the numbering of the list of the candidate. A city party official who coordinates the regional party will likely to be at the top list. The candidate is presumably to be more popular. However there might be some irregularities when a qualified and a fit cadre who is predicted to have a large number of supporters and will likely to gain more supporters, is placed at the top list. Although the structure is the main factor, it should be noted that other factors may come into play, including the factor of regional representation³⁹.

Similarly, Bambang Susatyo⁴⁰ states that the determination of the sequence of the list of the candidate is based on capability, integrity and the active role in political activism within the party.

The external acceptability will also influence the decision of the numbering. External acceptability is defined as the acceptability of the candidate by the people and how the

candidate will gain the support from them. Syahrul Yasin Limpo⁴¹ stated that:

To become a candidate, the party itself is not enough as there will be a requirement on the competence of the candidate. It is especially true in the case of the candidacy of the parliament and regional representatives. In addition to these, a candidate should master a certain level of acceptability by the public and good campaign management.⁴¹

External acceptability can be traced from the inputs from the community concerning the track records of the candidate. This can be done by conducting an electability survey. A candidate who gains a high electability will be considered to become the party's legislative candidate and to get a higher position on the list. The acceptability becomes a crucial factor to gain as much as votes especially under the system where figure plays a greater role than a party's platform. With the majority voters mechanism, a numbering list has becoming less crucial. Hence, it is important to select a candidate who is popular among the public.

Reuven Hazan's theory views that the team of seven consisting of the elites

³⁹ Interview with the Chairman of the DPD Partai Golkar Kota Makassar at the DPD office Kota Makassar, 14 March 2014.

⁴⁰ <http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2012/08/22/020322791Pendidikan.Jadi.Kriteria.Caleg>, accessed on 18 February 2014.

⁴¹ Syahrul Yasin Limpo, Chairman of the DPD Golkar - Sulawesi Selatan, as stated in <http://beritakotamakassar.com/>, accessed on 18 April 2014.

Table 5: The Comparison of Candidates from Politician Family and Non-Politician in Golkar Party at the 2009 Election

No.	Election	Number of Candidates	Number of Candidates from political dynasty	% candidates from political candidates	Number of elected candidates	Elected candidates from political dynasty	% of electability
1	DPR RI	29	4	13,79	8	2	25,00
2	DPRD Province	89	5	5,62	18	4	22,22
3	DPRD City of Makassar	60	5	8,33	11	3	27,27

Source: from various sources

of the party that selects the candidates, could be categorized as an exclusive recruitment and an elitist political recruitment. In this case, the elites have a deciding role in the selection process. They have a tendency to select a candidate who can help extend their powers. They utilize the democratic instrument to maintain the elites circulation. The issue is more obvious of its vested interests and biased process in the case when the elites are also the candidates. Such approach is also prominent in the decision making process where the information circulates around the elites, especially information on who will fit as a candidate.

The elites as the selection team generates an oligarchy in the decision making process, which, according to Michels, is called the oligarchy iron law. However, the majority voting system that depends much on the

popularity of the figure, forces the elites to be more open and to hear the people's preferences on the type of candidates they want. Golkar Party officials argue that although the candidate is related to the politician family, they are the capable ones and proof to be qualified. In numbering of the list of the candidates, the party tends to put them in the middle or lower list. However, they will likely to have a better electability than those on the top list, who do not have a relationship with the family of politician.

The table 5 shows that the number of candidates from the political dynasty was relatively small, yet they have a higher percentage of electability; 50 % for DPR RI candidates, 80 % for Provincial DPRD and 60 % for DPRD at the city of Makassar. From the data, 25 % of the elected candidates for DPR RI from the

Table 6.: The Quality of a First Time Legislative Candidates from the Political Dynasty in Golkar Party

Legislative Candidates (LC)	Index of quality of the candidates					Average index
	Education	Training	Political Party Organization	S o c i a l organization	Employment	
LC 1	3,00	2,00	1,50	2,50	1,75	2,15
LC 2	1,50	1,67	2,25	2,50	1,75	1,93
LC 3	1,50	1,67	1,25	2,25	2,75	1,83
LC 4	1,00	1,33	1,00	1,50	1,50	1,27
Average	1,75	1,67	1,50	2,19	1,94	1,98
Category	average	average	Low	Average	Average	Average

Golkar party are from the politician family. The percentages for the DPRD and DPRD Makassar are 22.22 % and 27.27 % respectively.

The Golkar party claims that although some of the candidates come from the politician family, the decision to select them as candidates is decided through the PDLT selection which is also based on their active role at the party.

Senior politician will automatically pass on their constituents to the next generation inside the Golkar party...whether it's a regent, former regent, chairman of Golkar and else. They will automatically pass them on to their children, unless the children do not want to be involved in politics. Even if they are forced to be involved in politics, they will fade out eventually due to their lack of experience about the party. Golkar is a dynamic party that the new generations who do not have a commitment with they party will be

sidelined, even if their parents are members of the Golkar elites. We can see the case in Bone and Sinjay, showing how the children of the old elite members were thrown out of the competition. The most important factor for the party is whether they have capability, irrespective of who are their parents. There is also other factor such as their ability to engage with other members⁴².

From the recruitment process within the Golkar party in South Sulawesi we can infer that, first, the party has a standard in conducting political recruitment comprises of internal acceptability (PD2LT) and external acceptability (electability). However, in practice, the standard has not always been applied due

⁴² Interview with Haris Yasin Limpo, Chairman of DPD Golkar Kota Makassar, 14 March 2014 at the office of the DPD Golkar Kota Makassar.

to the interest and the need for the party to gain support from the public. Second, there are sufficient human resources within the party so that the party focuses on conducting recruitment among its cadres.

Third, referring to the characteristic of recruitment as described by Reuven and Hazan, the recruitment process of the legislative candidates is exclusive and oligarchist as the elites dominate the process. As a result, political recruitment offers a better chance for the people in the inner circle of the elites. As we can see in table 6, the candidates from the political dynasty have an average quality which means that they are qualified to be a candidate. The candidates who come from political families tend to have more social and organizational experience, which are important features in the election.

Fourth, with the majority voting mechanism in place, the legislative candidates from the political dynasty have a better level of electability and able to gain more votes as compared to other candidates from non-political dynasty. In this regard, the proportionate election system based on majority voting has strengthened oligarchy and political dynasty.

Using the 4 factors of systemness degree, value identity, autonomous decision and the public image of

the institutionalization process as an analytical tool, it can be argued as follows; first, based on its degree of systemness, the Golkar party has a set of good mechanism and procedures as well as rule of the game for recruitment. The performance of the party shows that Golkar's performance is supported by good human resources.

However, there has been inconsistency within the party in practising the rule of the game. There are several cases to show this inconsistency. The party initially uses convention for recruitment process. Golkar also set the rule that anyone who did not pass the convention is not allowed to become the candidate for other parties. Yet, in 2007 election for the governor of South Sulawesi, Agus Arifin Nu'mang, who failed at the convention, was then became the candidate for the vice governor with Syahrul Yasin Limpo, the candidate for the governor from the Golkar party. If the party is consistent with their rules, both candidates should get a sanctions. In reality, there was no sanctions imposed on them. On the contrary, Syahrul Yasin Limpo was then appointed as the chairman of the Golkar Party in South Sulawesi. This case shows that pragmatism overrules the rules of the game. As a result there is no standard in the implementation of the party's policy.

In conducting political recruitment, the Golkar party has also been adapting with the changes, especially under majority voting system. In this system, figure and popularity are so dominant that the party has to change the recruitment mechanism by conducting a survey to measure electability of the people. In reality, there has been inconsistency in utilizing the survey in the selection process.

Second, based on the value identity and the changes of election system, political system and the party system, it is relatively difficult to differentiate Golkar party from other parties. It is also difficult to distinguish the political map of the constituent. The political environment is prone to changes which resulted in the shift of support and Golkar's decreasing number of votes. At a national level, South Sulawesi is considered as the main Golkar pocket, as the region has been successfully contributing a larger votes for Golkar as compared to other regions. At the local level, the existence of swing voters, makes it difficult to map out the basis of the support to the Golkar party.

Third, from the perspective of autonomous decision making process, Golkar is relatively independent and there is no external intervention to the party. However, there is a high degree of

competition within the party that makes the decision making process tend to be elitist and oligarchic. Despite the fact that Golkar declares itself as a democratic party and the recruitment process is being conducted in a transparent and objective manner, it cannot be denied that there is "the secret garden" in the decision to appoint candidates.

Fourth, from the perspective of public image, Golkar's party identity is inherent with its actors' identities. This is due to the culture of patron-client culture and aristocratic elitism that strongly rooted in the party. The actors of the party will affect the level of support obtained by the party.

From the fourth factors discussed above, arguably the institutionalization of the Golkar party is still considerably weak. It strengthens the role of political actors and offers chances for the actors to maximize their power in the party. It also strengthens the political dynasty inside the party. Further, the kinship and family connection are able to gain their strengths that they affect the creation of factions within the party.

The discussion above verifies O'Dwyer's thesis that a weak institutionalization encourages the creation of patronage and that a strong patronage will weaken

institutionalization of the party. In this line, it can be argued that there is a two ways connection between a weak institutionalization of the party and a strong political dynasty.

Conclusion

The growing trend of political dynasty in South Sulawesi in the reform era is closely related to South Sulawesi's history and its cultural factor which reflects a thick social stratification, patronage culture, and the trust extended by the people to their leaders and their family. These features have consequently strengthened political dynasty in the region.

A multy party system and a majority voting mechanism also provides opportunities for the popular figures, members of the politician's family, to join the candidacy. In the case of Golkar Party, despite the fact that there are many candidates from the politician's family, it is still able to meet the democratic selection procedure set up by the party. However, it should be noted that since the selection team is part of the elite politician of the party, political dynasty as represented by the number of popular figures among the politician's relatives joining the candidacy seems to be an unavoidable consequences. The unstable process of institutionalization within the

party on the one hand, and various challenges faced by the party, including competition from other parties, on the other, also contribute to the party's decision to select candidates among popular figures from the elite politician's families. This is part of the strategy to gain as many as votes from the people.

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