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Shifting Dynamics of Social Politics:
The Implication for Policy Making
and Community Empowerment



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Shifting Dynamics of Social Politics:
The Implication for Policy Making
and Comunity Empowerment

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Shifting Dynamics of Social Politics: The Implication for Policy Making and Community Empowerment

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BIG BUDGET, LOW IMPACT: AN ALTERNATIVE EVALUATION ON BENEFIT AND IMPACT OF SPECIAL FUND IN DI YOGYAKARTA, 2013-2015

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Abstract

Special region of Yogyakarta is the newest area that has reached constitutionality privilege status of three other special regions: Aceh, Papua and Jakarta. This paper is the results of combination from several data collection method such as survey, interview, and Focus Group Discussion in order to gather a more comprehensive data and analysis. In Addition, data are collected from official document, library literature, and media report. And the method of analysis is using descriptive and chronological. Lastly, conclusions are produced by induction and deduction model. This research findings are go as follow. First, good governance approach in funding are made to be preferred procedure in creating various program and privilege activities under the special fund (danais). Second, the philosophical debates are so dominant in three years instead in more substantial programs related to support and craeate more social welfare in the grassroot. Third, a large proportion of the budget allocation was spent in cultural events creating a serious public apathy where the principle of privilege and power for the welfare is still left behind. It is becoming provocative summery that the implementation of privilege regions during first three years is facing a condition what we called 'big budgets but low Impact.'

Keywords: Asymmetrical democracy, DIY, Evaluation, Welfare, Special Fund

INTRODUCTION

“Special Region” is a famous term of government practice within decentralization practice in Indonesia history since colonial periode. For instance, as attached status to Aceh, Papua, Jakarta, and Yogyakarta. Substantively, The special status of Yogyakarta doesn't has any distinction with other special region mentioned above. According to Eko Sutoro (Hadiwijoyo, 2009.p.52) in relating to desentralization, central government has been givinga recognition to the cultural diversity, the origin of society, and experience of political history to give special status. Yogyakarta Special Regions (DIY) itself reached special status under Law No.13/2012 and followed by special fund from national government each year. Nothing distinction

with other privilege regions, commonly the aims are to fulfill the fairness, social welfare, human right and basic right of society, increase the local citizen, giving chance to people to participate in development process, and decrease the gap between the rich and the poor in these regions in Aceh province, Papua, and west papua with other provinces in Indonesia (Zuhria, 2015).

Yogyakarta region is interpreted as lack of prosperous society based on economical side so it needs to be developed by improving trade industry, agriculture, SME, and other service sector which can be sustained by creating the economical infrastructure like traditional markets. Special society can be understood as a community who have own high level of knowledge and wisdom who is indicated from

the level of people education, and the high level of public participation, and the number of professional experts that are generated by better educational system. Special community is also one kind of the people who have own high level of health, small growth rate, high life expectancy and good quality of social services (DIY government documents).

This research is significant due to its concern on important historical, political and economic background that encourages the existence of special autonomy policies or granting privileges to the region, As what was stated by As-shiddiqie in (Hadiwijoyo, 2009) there are four prerequisites that must be met: (1) The policy can strengthen the foundations of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia; (2) Accelerate the prosperity of the local people; (3) support the welfare of all Indonesian people, (4) increase the development of social justice, and (5) reflecting the implementation of local people's sovereignty. Thus, the policy of special autonomy or granting privileges for a particular region not only become a symbol or slogan and make the area into a State within the State, but it will also be more oriented to the welfare of the people by remaining in the corridors of the Unitary State.

Asymmetrical decentralization in DIY has a different model from which are in Aceh, Jakarta, and Papua. The budgetary funding from the central government in the form of special autonomy funds for the two regions is already standart, While the budget for Privileges Fund is based on the number of submitted proposals and budget absorption by Yogyakarta's government. It triggers the DIY government to implement various strategies that are intended to maintain and increase the amount of annual budget (special fund). Among one of these strategies are to make as many cultural programs as possible for spending special fund without weighing the significant of the program—benefit and impact to the people. So far, stakeholders only pursue the quantity of the program and ignore the quality issue which should be a priority for people in the regions.

As a country whose economic system is still dependent on public sector financing, the hope

that decentralization policy in Indonesia can improve the welfare of the people significantly has not been fulfilled. This is like what happened in Yogyakarta which has special authority in governing the affairs of his government.

This special authority was strengthened when Law No. 13 of 2012 on Special Privileges of DIY had passed. This special law of DIY covers five core bussiness, namely the governor appointment, Institutional Affairs; Cultural Affairs; Land Affairs; and Spatial Affairs. By this legal document, it is expected that the Government of Yogyakarta can guarantai the right of the people to live in more prosperous condition. However, these expectations still has not be realized so far.

Yogyakarta Special Government gets big enough budget through privileged program. Disbursement of funds in 2013 amounted to IDR231.392.653.500. And it was increased in 2014 amounting to IDR523,874,719,000. Unfortunately, the amount of special fund budget has not been directly proportional impact to the level of community welfare by statistic. The lack of usefulness of the use of the special fund (*danais—dana keistimewaan*) are clearly illustrated by the low absorption of the budget by the people and Government which have not been able to contribute to the acceleration of the people's welfare in general. Based on data from the Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS) in September 2013, the percentage of urban and rural poor in DIY was 15.03%. Exactly, this figure come up from 2012 which previously amounted to 16.08% and ranked the top 10 provinces with the highest poverty rates in Java. However, the level of poverty in DIY remained the largest among all provinces, especially, in Jawa. The trend of poverty figures released by the Central Bureau of Statistics in Yogyakarta Special Region from 2011 to 2014 showed that the poverty rate continues to increase respectively. In 2011 the poverty rate was 257.909 and it reached into the number of 541.90 in 2014. This slightly illustrates how the actual contribution of privileged funds to the society welfare, if it is seen from the poverty rate which continues to increase. Based on released data by BPS in the final report of Gross regional productive analysis DIY 2011 to 2015 shows

that the income inequality in DIY still lame with the distribution of 40% low income society. Based on the above facts, so we are interesting to do research related to how the effectiveness of privileged funds in Yogyakarta

The vision that formulated by the Governor of DIY which is also as the king of of DIY changed the development paradigm from "Among Tani to DagangLayar (agriculture and coastal economy orientation) " in the hope of achieving the prosperity of his fellow citizens. However, the achievements indicate that the empowerment of the marine sector is still very minimum. Not only achievements at the level of outcomes, benefits, or expected impacts, but also the absorption of the budget in 2013 and 2014 was still low. Based on the special report of 2013, the privilege budget for 2013 stipulated by Regulation of the Minister of Finance issued on 17 October 2013 Number 140 / PMK.07 / 2013 the special fund amount was IDR 231,392,653,500. physical achievement Aggregate could only be achieved as big as 29,41%. While the financial realization amounted to IDR 54,562,180,053, or about 23.58% of the ceiling. This is caused by the process of preparing of the new DPA which was completed in October 2013 so that the implementation time was only 2 months.

In 2014 through Regulation of the Minister of Finance No. 36 / PMK.07 / 2014 on General Guidelines and Allocation of Privileged Funds of Special Region of Yogyakarta, Local Government of DIY get budget allocation in the privilege of IDR 523.874.719.000. In general, the realization of financial uptake is IDR 272.056.608.289,00 or about 51.93% of the total budget. The largest budget allocation for the use of privileged funds in 2014 was cultural affairs with a budget of IDR 375,178,719,000. While spatial affairs only amounted to IDR 123,620,000,000.

RESEARCH METHODS

In the modern scientific community worldwide (Stehr 1991, 1994), there are a high need to scientifically prove the effectiveness, efficiency, quality, and application of political programs and standards in all areas of society so that an appropriate analysis knife is needed

to know and explain the objective situation. Departing from the facts, the researchers used the method of evaluation in this study. Evaluation research operates in a field which is characterized by a diverse range of power and interest groups, and it is confronted with, and engaging in problematic social situations, trends, policies, and effects.

According to Stufflebeam (in Lincoln & Guba; 14) evaluation can be defined as process of describing, obtaining, and applying information descriptively about the benefits of multiple objects as defined by its objectives, structure, processes, and products.

The evaluation approach is used to conduct an assessment of the existence of a government program, in this case is the existence of privileged funds to the welfare of the community. This research will produce some big information stages as described by Kusek (2004) about the stages of information that will be obtained through evaluation research that are strategy, execution or process implementation, and learning.

Evaluation research in this case is intended to support, document, and monitor the social and intra-organizational changes and desired learning processes (Torres et al, 1996). The results of this evaluation study are expected to provide support for decision-making and planning, and from a client's point of view, aiding better monitoring processes, higher rationality, and improve product quality, and providing arguments for the achievement of goals and interests (Von Kardorff 1998a; Madaus et al., 1983; Rossi and Freeman 1993; Weiss 1998; see 6.3). In essence, evaluation research understands constructivist-based realities. Social reality is understood as the result of communicative and interactive negotiated structures, which manifested in patterns of meaning, discourses, social representations, and patterns of action.

In this study, researchers use several data collection techniques. First, an experimental quantitative-based approach (Bortz and Doring, Wottawa and Thierau 1998). The model of this approach is data collection through interviews with a questionnaire of 250 recipients, with the balance between men and women. Respondents consisted of several job backgrounds.

This research was conducted in Yogyakarta, Bantul, Sleman, Gunungkidul, and Kulonprogo districts. Second, an integrative qualitative-based approach (Guba and Lincoln 1998; Shaw 1999). In this approach, data are collected from government documents, media analysis, literature review, and dissemination of the Focus Group Discussion (FGD) at the time of exposure to research results. The wide range of selected techniques is aimed to obtain a valid, factual, and reliable data.

The next stage is data analysis. According to Effendi (1989) data analysis is the process of simplifying the data into a form that is easier to read and interpret. In this study, the authors use analytical techniques with a qualitative approach as the theory of Miles and Huberman (1992, in Agus Salim, 2006). Miles and Huberman's theory can be described as follows: (1) coding/data reduction; (2) thematization; (3) determining the story line; (4) developing the storyline and theorizing; (5) analysis by linking themes to available theory and/or seeking relationships with other themes; (6) drawing conclusions.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Special status of Yogyakarta is one of the public policy due to the central position of the local and national government. Thomas R. Dye (in Suharto, 2007) says that whatever government does or does not do is public policy. Mostly, public policy aims to manage, organize program, distribute the benefit, and control people.

The issues of asymmetric decentralization attract many researchers to examine. There are several attempts by researchers to understand the dynamics of local politics or in this case the practice of implementing asymmetric decentralization in academic studies based on factual or empirical fact with a fairly rigorous methodology. Almost all literatures on decentralization stated that there are three important components underlying the aspects of political structure, administration, and the dimension of the relationship between the public sector and private sector (private). This is being best described by Turner and Hulme as the table below:

The World Bank since 1999 have had a large and concentrated interest in various decentralization projects. This world class lending institution explained that decentralization encompasses various aspects of political, administrative, tax and market decentralization. The political decentralization aspect as a big umbrella to allow decentralization in other fields to run. The World Bank explained that the goal of political decentralization is to open wide space to citizens and representatives/ governments in the regions to make better policy decisions. Meanwhile, Rondinelli (1999) provided a very comprehensive definition of decentralization. He wrote:

“Decentralization is the transfer of planning, decision making or administration authority from the central government to its field organizations, local administrative units, semi autonomous and parastatal organizations, local governments or non-government organization.”

Nature of Delegation	Basic for Delegation	
	Territorial	Functional
Within formal political structures	Devolution (political decentralization, local government, democratic decentralization)	Interest group representation
Within public administrative or parastatal structures	Deconcentration (administrative decentralization, field administration)	Establishment of parastatals
From state sector to private sector	Privatization of developed function (deregulation, contracting out, voucher schemes)	Privatization of national functions (divestiture, deregulation, economic liberalization)

source: Turner & Hulme, 1997

Rondinelli added that decentralization including asymmetric decentralization in DIY has several benefits which are: (1) reducing the centrality control of development planning by the central government with greater delegation of authority to regions; (2) region will have higher sensitivity to problems occurring in the region; (3) spur more creative, innovative, responsive areas; (4) enhancing the accountability of bureaucrats and people's representatives; (5) increasing political, social, and economic participation of the community; (6) public services to be efficient and effective; and (7) decentralization can enhance national stability and unity. Each of these points can actually be structured as an indicator and how it is practiced and can be evaluated, how and where the gap lies between the ideal and the reality.

In some provinces in Indonesia, including DIY as a study in this paper, is an area with asymmetric decentralization regulation. The asymmetric decentralization term is also widely used in the study of decentralization in other countries. This concept is used to cling to the special treatment of the rebellious areas (demands independence) and responds with special treatment. Problems such as Quebec in France, Basques in Spain, Sammi in Norway, Mindanao in the Philippines, and similiarather case that have been commonly discussed within the framework of the asymmetry of the administrative order. In this context, a special treatment for Aceh and Papua is in the tradition of asymmetric decentralization studies which already popular in the literature.

According to PurwoSantoso, this asymmetric democracy policy as a response of academicians and civil society in general to the militaristic government, as applied in New Order era, where the regime had a tendency to make uniformity. The post-reform politics opportunity made it possible to advocate for the region. Asymmetry of decentralization feels urgency to be developed when we dare to understand and develop a system of government in a contextual (PurwoSantoso, 2012). If it being studied, Indonesian nation had known 'special area' since long time ago. Constitution (UUD) has accommodated this kind of political

part. Also, the colonial era, in "Decentralisatie Wet", on 23rd July, 1903, has imposed an asymmetric concept of regions in managing the state territory by distinguishing treatment between Java and non-Jawa islands. In this case, the nuances of this political agenda funding are the most prominent.

There was also research on the actual situation of decentralization and its financing that author can present, firstly, an interesting thesis statement from (Sakir, 2015) entitled "Analysis of privileges budget policy of special region of Yogyakarta in 2014" proved that the implementation of privileges budget policy since 2013 until 2015 was still not maximized. Through qualitative research methods and data collection techniques of in-depth interview and elite interview models, Saakir found that the use of privileged funds was dominated for artificial cultural events. In addition, in his research syakir explained that the implementation of privileged funds has not had a significant impact on output and outcome to be achieved.

Second, study entitled "Democratization Problems in Asymmetric Decentralization Post-ordebaru" that conducted by MardyantoWahyuTryatmojo in 2012. This study focused on the problematics of asymmetric decentralization in four regions. The authors also focused their research to examine deeper issues of special autonomy funds that were perceived to be ineffective. In his research Mardyanto found that the problematic democratization at the local level occurred due to the design of political institutions that determined by the central government, but it didn't guarantee that the central government understand the situation and conditions in the region. An interesting finding from this research is the massive control of certain groups in the management of policies and special autonomy funds.

Third, a journal article entitled "The Impact of Special Autonomy to the Welfare of Indigenous Papuans in the Eastern Mimika District of Mimika Regency of Papua Province". This quantitative research was conducted by Wiwie S. Iryanti by focusing on the impact of special autonomy funds on the welfare of the East Mimika community. She found that the

existence of special autonomy has not been able to provide prosperity to the East Mimika people.

Fourth, scientific paper from Dewi Kartika entitled "Analysis of Privileged Funds readiness of Yogyakarta Special Region in 2013 Fiscal Year". This study sought to identify the constraints which are faced by local governments in regulating privileges in 2013 and beyond it. The author used qualitative descriptive method in his research. The findings of this study demonstrated that there were four obstacles in the privileges of 2013 and there were five attempts by the local government to resolve these problems. The four obstacles were limited implementation time, dense local government activity, lack of human resource capability that is underlying and there was no detailed description of privileged fund in constitution.

Fifth, the results of Wulandari and Sulistio research (2013), that the special autonomy policy could indeed be claimed to have succeeded in significantly improving Papua Province's regional finances, but the policy has not succeeded in increase the economy and prosperity of the people. The failure of the special autonomy policy to improve the economy welfare of the people in Papua is caused by several things, that are: Firstly, there was an inequality in understanding and perception of special autonomy between central government, local government and society; Secondly, lateness of the process of regulations implementation drafting in the form of Government Regulation (PP), Provincial Regulation (Perda) or Special Regional Regulation (Perdasus); Third, In reality, the policy of proliferation ("pemekaran") was not being supported by adequate government infrastructure; Fourth, the Special Autonomy Policy opened the opportunities for some irresponsible parties to corrupt and waste the special autonomy funds.

Furthermore, the research from Yuwono and Waimbo (2012) explained that the granting of special autonomy in Papua was not necessarily solved the political problems which faced by the Papuan people. The problem of the democratization process which was initially ignored by the central government seemed to be neglected by the local government in special

autonomy era. In the economic field, people's income has also not improved significantly. The poverty level is still relatively high, not much different from the previous condition. From a cultural point of view, where the vertical conflict in the ordebaruregim which penetrated both migrant and indigenous conflicts, when special autonomy was implemented, it causes the conflict between mountain communities and coastal communities. The implementation of special autonomy has not been able to solve the concerns that faced by the Papuan people. The thing to be aware of is the excesses that arised in society. The conflict may not be a vertical conflict, but it will be a horizontal conflict that is driven by the interests of local elites that are sometimes motivated by a regional ego. As a result of this fact, the support of various elements of society towards special autonomy in Papua began to weaken instead of further strengthens pessimism over the future of the special autonomy implementation in the region.

Rumbino also conducted (2011) study on APBD allocations of special autonomy Papua especially in the education fields. Broadly speaking, the finding was that: some budget posts were used up for programs that have been determined by the Provincial Government of Papua, while the participation and priorities derived from society or lower government structures have not been accommodated well. In fact, there were still many budgets which were considered unclear, so that the needs that were in direct contact with the participants have not been met yet.

In addition, other cases of budget allocation management were found from Herzon's (2011) study, where he proved that contestation in the Public Works Department's direct expenditure budget was due to an imbalance of interests between the legislative and executive actors who involved in the discussion. The contestation between the legislature (the Budget Agency and the Commission III of DPRD) with the executive (TAPD and Public Works Department) is analogous to a "whisper" or closed collaboration work. In this study, it is also seen that the number of legislators representing its territory becomes the determinant factor for the inclusion of the aspirations of the people in

the electoral district in the budget deliberation agenda, Then the contestation put the DPRD as the dominant actor in budget discussions. This has led to disparities in other electoral districts with few legislative members. The budget policy flowed from the interests of the executive and legislative actors and went down to the community, while it should have come from the rising public interest which affecting the views and values of the actor. As a result, budget alignments to the public interest were minimum and could be said not at all. Based on the results of this study, it is suggested that the Local Government have to provide broad access to the community together with NGOs concerned with the public budget in Kerinci District to actively participate and oversee every process of regional planning and budgeting.

In general, the eight studies above addressed the designation of asymmetric decentralization and its impact on society. The authors wish to emphasize that the focus of this research is to discuss the impacts as well as the causes of 'ineffectiveness' in the implementation of asymmetric decentralization of DIY especially in designing the Privileged Fund. The study also wants to answer the question of why a large Privileged Fund has not been directed to encourage the resolving of actual welfare issues such as poverty, economic inequality and local food security. In other words, this paper not only describes on how privileged funds work during the first three years, but also provides a discourse on how privileged funds should be in the welfare of society and how the special fund should work.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS

In his speech, Sri Sultan HB X stated that the renaissance brings the culture and education as the basic capital of the revival of new civilization in Yogyakarta. By building togetherness, refinement and nobility through education and culture as social capital. This seems to be misunderstood by stakeholders who then put the cultural aspect into a high portion of the fund (sindonews.com, 2012). Head of the Regional Development Planning Agency (Bappeda) of DIY, TavipAgusRiyanto said the largest portion fund for culture. In

contrast to what was conveyed by the Head of Bappeda DIY Representative of the Regional Representative Council (DPD) RI, DKR Hemas said there is a misperception in the community against the use of privilege fund. The Cultural Sector is a priority in the privilege because the identity of Yogyakarta is the culture. This reason seems to be a reference for stakeholders who assume themselves as community guardians in managing privileged funds. Whereas according to the results of the evaluation of funds is the year 2014 found that there was no special design that discusses and explain which related to Privileges fund so that the public have not understood clearly in what context the priv fund should work. The community assumes that DIY privilege can only be maintained through the improvement of cultural programs so that the largest allocation is for cultural events (tribunjogja.com, 2015).

At the strategic stage, the fundamental question posted is whether the activity or program can be completed, it is certainly proven by empirical and rational data. In the operation phase, the fundamental question raised is whether a policy, program or activity can be properly resolved. In this section, what is assessed is the effectiveness of a policy, program or activity in achieving the expected outcomes, efficiency in optimizing existing resources, and the level of community satisfaction. The last stage is learning, the learning stage provides information about the existence of innovation or precise strategies of policy makers or activities which consist of alternative ways, best practices, and lesson learning.

Because of this evaluation research benefit here seeks to integrate between work achievements as well as the interaction and public responsiveness of the privileged activity schemes, of course these findings also begin from the assumptions and then it is argued to look for relevant responses for the internal improvement agenda of the fund management organization.

Some key findings include; (a) the community is satisfied with the use of the funds but the benefits are insignificant: (b) the public may receive enormous cultural allocations, but does not address the actual cultural challenges

of DIY: cultural infrastructure, cultural sustainability, sovereignty and segregation of elite culture and popular culture; (c) large enough funds, accessible, high participation, but the roadmap is not yet clear for the actual issues of agendas such as poverty, inequality, infrastructure, sovereignty and food self-sufficiency.

Finding 1: Communities are satisfied with the use of funds but the benefits are not rational and significant enough

Regional development in the framework of the 2014 special privilege includes five affairs that are: The Governor and Vice Governor appointment, Institutional design, Culture, Land use, and Spatial Planning as stipulated in Law no. 13/2012 on Special Privileges of Yogyakarta. Politically, the appointment of the governor is the main issues. In this case, democracy is localized and claimed as local-cultural democracy. Institutional Affairs is managed by one SKPD namely the Organization Bureau. Cultural Affairs is managed by 23 SKPD including 5 SKPD at Regency and City level in DIY (Bappeda, 2015). Land Affairs is handled by one SKPD namely Bureau of Governance of Regional Secretary of DIY and Spatial affairs is managed by two SKPD namely Department of PUP-ESDM DIY and Department of Hubkominfo. Overall SKPD of the special funds holders consists of 25 SKPD so-called KPA. Meanwhile the budget for the whole allocation, in accordance with Regulation of the Minister of Finance No. 36 / PMK.07 / 2014 of 3rd of february 2014 on General Guidelines and Allocation of Privileged Funds of Special Territory of Yogyakarta amounted to IDR 523,874,719,000.

Not much different from the results in 2013 or 2015, during the implementation of programs and activities in year fiscal of 2014, the performance (physical) realization if it compared to the target is about 92.77% while the financial realization is 64.88% of the budget ceiling. Of course, this is not a bad achievement. But it is also reported that, there are still many internal issues related to human resources, regulatory understanding, and cooperation with the private sector. In the report document,

very few aspects of community and community participation are alluded to either as a driving force or as an impediment. Similarly, Sakir (2015) found that the quality of special funds expenditures caused the absorption of privileged funds from 2013 to 2015 did not optimal. In 2013, the budget absorption was 23.58%, 2014 was 64.88% while in 2015 it was 20.06% in first stage. The objective of danais is very noble that is to improve the welfare of the society as the aspiration of the privilege of Yogyakarta. However, if it is seen from the aspect of output and outcome, the exercise of the privileges has not own the clear identification of output and outcome yet.

Spatial and land issues are the most urgent in privileges and “danais” schemes. This structural damage is so severe so there is an excessive pesimism among the public regarding the prospect of the danais. The policy in the conceptual level is contrary to what happens in the field. The dominance of the modern market economy is not only marginalizing the power of the local economy, destroying spatial, but they are also againtslocal culture, and endangering local economy entities. This is a very serious challenge in the era of special stature of DIY. Also, the agrarian issues are still taboo discussed in the open space. This is also a job that must end soon.

Another important thing that makes this finding interesting is the magnitude of the privileged funding budget has not been directly proportional to the government’s achievement on the scale of the welfare level of the community. Lack of usefulness of this privileged budget funds use clearly illustrated by the low ability to absorb the budget by the Government of Yogyakarta and it has not been able to contribute in the acceleration of people’s welfare in significant number. Based on data from the Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS) in September 2013 the percentage of urban and rural poor in DIY is 15.03%. This figure is down from the year 2012 which previously amounted to 16.08% and ranked the top 10 provinces with the highest poverty rates. Yet the poverty rate in DIY remains the largest among all provinces in Java. The trend of poverty figures released by the BPS from 2011-2014 shows that

the poverty rate continues to remain in place. In 2011, the poverty rate was 257,909 and reached 541,90 in 2014. This slightly illustrates how exactly the contribution of privileged funds to the welfare of the community D.I.Y if the poverty rate continues to increase. Based on data released by the Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS) in the final report of Gross Regional Productivity Analysis of DIY 2011-2015, the income inequality in DIY is still unequal with 40% low income society, 40% middle income group and 20% high income society.

In addition, there are fundamental issues about the location of regional autonomy that has not been resolved whether in the district / city or provincial governments. There are many impacts of this problem. Stakeholders of the privilege fund of Keraton and Pakualaman arrangement have the interest of internal coordination of Kasultanan and Pakualaman to equate perception to the implementation of Special Law and also the necessity to consolidate existing strengths such as central and local political elite, local and national capitalist, local community to ensure this special budget are more useful for the regional development.

Finding 2: A certain communities receive big budget, but does not address the actual challenges of local culture, its infrastructure development and sustainability, also the problem of segregation between elite and grassroot culture.

Sultan on several occasions reminded that the use of privileged funds not only limited to cultural activities but also can be developed for other activities such as community empowerment so that people become more independent and cultured.

This study found data from four districts and cities in DIY that as many as 60% of people agree if the allocation of privileges for culture is more than 70% of the total and 38% of the people who disagree with the allocation. This study is reinforced by the results of special meeting in district perspectives on 19th of May, 2016, the management of privileged funds has not been optimal due to the activities that are accommodated privileged funds are still many ceremonial events such as jatilan and wayangan activities. At that

time, the implementation of the activities did not involve the distraction as a budget user but directly to the government village.

Visible, in the third year there are efforts to initiate privileged funds directed to rationalized infrastructure sector on the grounds of the need for protection of Yogyakarta culture such as parking and trade relocation zones. In the first two years of 2013 and 2014 fiscal year there was no such strategic and creative thinking. The public has already been constructed that the usefulness of the danais is clear and inflexible-when in reality it is not as strict as imagined earlier in the year. It may be that, because the process of technocracy tends to make the public only a passive object or subject so that the sensible ideas of society are not accommodated by the government's reason. If the culture belongs to the people, the people will know more and give more color as to how to calculate all things related to it (know-how). It is clearly because the struggle to get special status has involved so many actors from traditional groups and mobilized a huge cultural and political resource within society (Efendi, 2015).

There are 3 factors that affect the implementation and budget realization of 2013 special fund. Firstly, in terms of the tools of the regulation used as a foothold for the implementation of privileges program has not been completed. So, the program implementers (SKPD) do not have adequate guidance for empowering and realizing those programs. Second, the alignment side of planning, budgeting and implementation between the Central and Regional, Where the transfer of special allocation of budget year 2013 was done during the process of implementation of the budget entering the limit of the budget spending. Third, the availability of adequate time for planning, budgeting and implementation. Based on the proposed activity plan proposed by the Local Government of DIY, it is known that most privileged activities require time in implementation, so privileged funds become less effective if not starting from the beginning of the year. Forcing the allocation and disbursement of the privileges of 2013 is ineffective and inconsistent with the spirit of Law no. 13/2013 (Wulandari, 2015).

Government efforts in realizing good governance by involving the public in the privileges fund has not been optimal yet. This is a question mark, the article based on a field survey in 2015 found that 78% of the people of DIY know the existence of privileges Fund. However, only 29% of those who have submitted funding proposals. The low participation of the Yogyakarta community in accessing the Privileged Fund is caused by the lack of public knowledge of the privilege application procedure. From the survey conducted there are 75% of respondents do not know how the procedure of filing Privileged Funds while enthusiastic community of DIY in applying privileges of 93%. The low understanding of the community related to privileged funds describes the performance of SKPD in the less optimal socialization process.

To realize the spirit of awakening of Yogyakarta in all sectors of development with *bermayungkan* culture, the government of DIY plans and formulates strategic policies such as cultural policy and tourism. This policy basically embodies cultural-based tourism governance that prioritizes the welfare of society. The vision formulated by the Governor of DIY as the king of DIY changed the development paradigm from “Among Tani to Trade Screen” in the hope of achieving community prosperity. However, the achievements indicate the empowerment of the marine sector is still very minimum. Not only the achievement of the level of outcomes, benefits, or expected impacts, but also the absorption of the budget in 2013 and 2014 was still low. Based on the privileges of 2013, the special budget of year 2013 stipulated through the Regulation of the Minister of Finance, published date on 17th October 2013 Number 140 / PMK.07 / 2013 of IDR 231,392,653,500. Aggregate physical achievement can only be achieved as big as 29,41%. While the financial realization of IDR 54.562.180.053, or equal to 23.58% of the ceiling. This happened because of the process of preparing the new DPA had completed in October 2013 so that the implementation time was only 2 months. When viewed from the absorption, then the land affairs occupy the highest percentage of 70%. However, it is noteworthy that land affairs are the least allocated. The land issue in DIY is closely

related to the existence of Sultanate Ground (SG) and Pakualaman Ground (PAG) that located in DIY which is still recognized by the government and its fellow traditional citizens. The land is spread over 4 (four) districts and the city of Yogyakarta. Sultan Ground covers 16.7 million square meters in Bantul Regency, in Kulonprogo District 10.3 million square meters, in Sleman Regency 3 million square meters, and in Yogyakarta City 800 thousand square meters. The total area of SG and PAG are only about 1.2 percent of the total area of DIY. Along with the variety of cases located in the southern coastal areas, the allocation of funds should also lead to the solution of the problem (Wulandari, 2015).

In 2014 through the Regulation of the Minister of Finance No. 36 / PMK.07 / 2014 on general guidelines and allocation of this special funds of DIY get the budget allocation for 2013 was IDR 523.874.719.000 in total. In general, the realization of financial absorption is IDR 272.056.608.289,00 or about 51.93% of the total ceiling. The largest budget allocation for the use of privileged funds in 2014 is cultural affairs with a budget of IDR 375,178,719,000. while spatial affairs only amount to IDR 123,620,000,000. Spatial and land issues are most urgent in privileges and danish schemes. The damage of this structure causes the excessive pessimism among the public about the prospect of *danais*. The policy in the conceptual level is contrary to what happens in the field. The dominance of the modern market economy is not only marginalizing the power of the local economy, destroying spatial, as well as cultural, as well as humanism of city residents. This is a very serious challenge in the era of special status due to this policy paradox (Stone, 2002).

Finding 3: the provided budget is accessible and high partisipation, however the roadmap of special fund has not been clear yet as solution for the actual problem such as poverty, inequality, infrastructure, and food self-sufficiency

On the other hand, the use of privileges budget is too dependent on the cultural sector that puts forward the ceremonial activities. This is in line with those found in Sakir (2015) study revealing four weaknesses of regulatory funding arrangements. First, the budget allocation of

this special fund is more dominant for cultural affairs—not directly adrees an actual problem in DIY such as poverty and job opportunity, that 2013 allocation and cultural affairs of 91.86%, 2014 of 71.62% and 2015 gets allocation for 76.87%. Sri Sultan HB X in a speech stated that the renaissance of Yogyakarta put the culture and education as the basic capital of the revival of new civilization, by building togetherness, refinement and nobility through education and culture. This seems to be misunderstood by stakeholders who then put the cultural aspect into a high portion of the fund. Quoted from (sindonews.com, 2012) Head of the Regional Development Planning Agency (BappedaDIY) TavipAgusRiyanto said the largest fund for culture. In contrast to what was conveyed by the Head of Bappeda DIY Representative of the Regional Representative Council (DPD) RI, DKR Hemas said there is a misperception in the community towards the utilization of danais. Because during the majority danais only used in the cultural sector only (tribunjogja.com, 2015). Research conducted by Efendi (2015) conducted in four districts/cities in DIY found that as many as 51% of people strongly disagree if the allocation of privileges for culture sebnayak more than 70% and only 2% of people who agree if the allocation of funds privileges for the field Culture is more than 70% of the total budget. This study is reinforced by the results of special meeting in kecamatan perspectives on 19 May 2016, the management of privileged funds has not been optimal due to the activities that are accommodated privileged funds there are still many ceremonial events such as jatilan activities.

Secondly, Sakir (2015) found that the quality of special fund expenditures caused the absorption of this funds from 2013 to 2015 is not optimal yet. In 2013, for exemple, the budget absorption was 23.58%, in 2014 was 64.88% while in 2015 it was 20.06% in the first semester. Third, the main fungtion of special funds. The purpose of the fund is very noble to improve the welfare of the society who is the aspiration of the privilege of Yogyakarta. However, if it judged from the aspect of benefit and impacts, the exercise of the privileges of the privilege of the lack of clear identification of output and

outcome. Fourth, Stakeholders of Privileged Funds. There is a fundamental issue about the location of regional autonomy that has not been resolved whether in the local government or province. There are many impact of this problem. Stakeholders of the privilege fund of Keraton and Pakualaman arrangement have the interest of internal coordination of Kasultanan and Pakualaman to equate perception to the implementation of Special Law and also the necessity to consolidate existing strengths such as central and local political elite, capitalist, community to ensure danais useful.

It can be said that for the first-three years the implementation of special budget of 2013 to 2015, did not show an objectively exhilarating achievement. The arguments is quite objectified to confront two elemen between spending budget and outcome especially on the longterm benefit and impact. What causes big budget low impact in this political policy in DIY are can be tracked from bureaucratic constraints, design of budget allocation, local political constraints. These factors are more valid questions instead of be stuck on bureaucratic and human resources issues.

This wasan evident from the recommendation of 2014 for the improvement of management as well as circulation. First, the addition of human resources, especially for financial managers. The addition of working hours is also needed to overcome the problem of limited time to work on activities in the agenda; Secondly, procurement issues are related to the performance of ULP in which the procurement of funds together with procurement from regular APBD funds can be overcome by coordinating with ULP to prioritize privileges procurement. It is necessary to timely arrangement of goods procurement; Third, for PA and KPA to be more careful in preparing operational plan implementation of activities to be executed so that activities can be done efisien, effective, and timely. Apparently, this type of recommendation does not provide much learning for internal organization for continuous improvement as suggested byKusek and Rist (2004) and also in the standard of total quality management (Morgan &Murgatroyrd, 1999) that require total performance. Rather, the implementation

of special budget in Yogyakarta as one of asymmetric decentralized region seem like an evolution in progress toward society welfare.

CONCLUSION

Due to this paper is an alternative evaluation, it can be stated that special fund has not been able to work for the welfare as expected by both the political elite and the local community in general. As an indicator is the gini index in DIY as released by BPS. This indicator is supported by Stiglitz (2004). Job opportunity is another indicator based on his thought (Stiglitz, 2005) in order to strongly criticize the logic of economic growth under the neoliberal value. This situation is characterized by several circumstances. Firstly, although the structure of open opportunity for participation, but there is phenomenon where enthusiastic of society to participate to the using of the privileged funds are low, especially in the year 2013-2015. Large participation is only for certain groups who have access and gain a trust as the receiver of the fund. Because of this participation problem, the funds that should work for the greatest benefit of the people of Yogyakarta become unattainable. Second, Stakeholder Funds Privileges. There is a fundamental issue about the location of regional autonomy that has not been resolved whether in the local government or province. The impact of this problem is many. Stakeholders of the privilege fund of Keraton and Pakualaman arrangement have the interest of main elites (Kasultanan and Pakualaman) to equate perception to the implementation of law on Special privilege and also the necessity to consolidate any existing strengths such as central and local political elite, capitalist or businessman, community to ensure special fund are useful enough.

Finally, the position of beneficiaries of privileges. Following the problem or others special regions, it is clear that the beneficiaries of the specialty of Yogyakarta are the people of DIY as a whole but in fact the fund distribution is not really equal. It can be seen from 2013 to 2015 the impact of the privileges of Yogyakarta's privileges has not been significant, has not been able to contribute to the acceleration of the people's welfare. that is the inability of this fund

to work to reduce DIY poverty rate which is now 14.55% and the income gap.

Local government said that technical delays in transferring money is main problem (Dardias, wikidpr.org), but in our finding, following Stiglitz, asymmetrical information received by among stakeholder and also people and its has been creating so many conflict of interest and prioritise elites's agenda instead of public interest.

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